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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to show the link between water use, land consolidation, 
agribusinesses, and the water crisis that California now faces. In order to better understand the 
relationship between the growth of agribusiness in the state and the evolution of water policy, 
this paper explores the historical context of land policy, the growth of farming in the San Joaquin 
Valley, and the development of federally funded water projects in the Central Valley. Years of 
expanding farmland, use of surface and underground water with limited regulation have played 
an important role in exacerbating California’s water problems. The impact of corporate farming 
and the conversion of row crops and grazing land to crops that required abundant water year 
round, such as fruit and nut trees, were profound. Predictions made by early champions of the 
160 acre limitation for access to publicly funded water programs came to fruition as 
environmental and social issues plagued the Central Valley. Efforts to divert any real change to 
water policy by corporate farmers and power brokers in the state were largely a success in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. However, farmers themselves began to feel the 
consequences caused by years of unregulated pumping from aquifers as soil salinity levels 
increased each year, causing salt to build up in the soil and reducing crop yields or led to 
collapse of aquifer systems altogether. Although the focus of this paper is on the San Joaquin 
Valley, attention was given to the Sacramento Valley in order to show what impact water 
diversion and relocation has had on the entire state.  Change in water policy is necessary to stave 
off environmental and economic crisis that will eventually come if water continues to be used in 
the manner it has. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 Aridity in the American West has served as a unifying descriptor for large swaths of the 
United States located west of the Hundredth Meridian. People living in arid regions have had to 
deal with water scarcity, in addition to other issues, as they established laws, built communities 
and infrastructure, and planned for future growth. Different ways in which state and local leaders 
have addressed the issue of water scarcity and use in their respective states have, to some degree, 
led to a variety of consequences for and differences in the social, political, and economic 
structure of their societies. One thing remained constant, however, and that was when water 
became so limited as to threaten metropolitan areas or agricultural economies, residents became 
increasingly concerned with how water was being used in their state. That is not to say people 
were unconcerned until a crisis occurred, but most residents did not pay enough attention to 
policy when water was plentiful to elicit long-term change. No better example of this 
phenomenon exists than California, which had some of the most impressive water holding and 
redistribution networks in the nation and yet suffered from periodic episodes of drought and the 
uncertainty over whether or not water resources would be readily available in the future. Much of 
what helped shape land and water policy in California were the ways in which the state was 
settled, the people that came first and established rules, and the growth of economic systems 
rooted in a modern capitalist society. 
Carey McWilliams was able to write about the history of California in a way that 
captured the essence of what made California unique even in the early twenty-first century. 
Written during the postwar boom in 1949, McWilliams’s historiography, California: The Great 
Exception, provides insight into the reasons why California developed in the manner it had. 
McWilliams made a point of explaining the differences between land settlements in California 
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versus that of other states, pointing to the Gold Rush as the primary reason for the differences. 
Land grabs that occurred in the early years of settlement were a consequence of Forty-niners 
making their own rules to ensure some type of structure for the process of mining and setting up 
mining camps. This was important as an immediate concentration in ownership of lands that 
were agriculturally suitable impacted the social and economic development of the state in ways 
that resonated well into the 2010’s. Inspired by the Gold Rush, fortune hunters of every ilk were 
drawn to California which helped to create a unique social mix in which average citizens, men of 
adventure, and immigrants were able to make substantial profits from mining, either directly or 
indirectly. This also meant that individuals without a keen understanding of how important it was 
to be a steward of land and resources often found themselves in positions of power in California. 
Lucky individuals who were able to get the lion’s share of the land before other settlers arrived 
made a fortune but had little desire to see others in a position to compete for economic and 
political power. Such individuals often worked around laws that guaranteed free land to others in 
order to ensure their prominence.  
Consequences of land grabs and efforts to secure economic dominance left considerably 
less arable land open to settlement by Homesteaders than was open in other states west of the 
Appalachians. McWilliams cites biographical information on land baron Henri Miller as a prime 
example of the growth of agricultural estates in California with much of the statistics and 
analysis given by Paul S. Taylor, noted agricultural economist and author of several articles 
pertaining to land development and water use in California, for support. As conception and 
construction of public water programs began, the issue of land consolidation became an 
important factor in determining who should and would receive water.  McWilliams made it clear 
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that neither the spirit of the Homestead Act nor the letter of the law was adhered to in California, 
making water issues all the more complicated as private parties made money from public works. 
Popular imagery of what a farm looked like did not match the reality of corporatization of 
farming that occurred in California. To support these claims, McWilliams referenced Walter 
Goldschmidt’s report, “As You Sow,” which compared the impact agribusiness had on 
dependent communities versus communities whose economy and social structure revolved 
around small farms. Unfortunately, many states have experienced changes in farming that often 
resembled more and more the agribusinesses found in California, such as agricultural giants 
Dole, Grimmway Farms, and Foster Farms. Agribusiness nationwide had been on the decline in 
the 1930s; price supports during WWII led to a short burst of growth, but the decline continued 
into the 1970s for most of the nation. This was not true for California, despite its feeling the 
pressures of periodic economic stagnation, as new farms sprang up to support the increased labor 
force of the 1940s. For this reason, perhaps, McWilliams presents California as a being in a 
constant state of development.  
When McWilliams published The Great Exception, he noted that if the Sacramento and 
San Joaquin Valleys utilized their combined water resources, there would still not be enough 
water to irrigate the total land available for farming in the Central Valley.  That was in 1949; 
since then the population increased from just over ten million residents to almost forty million in 
2015, and although it is true that the total number of acres of farmland dropped from 37 million 
to 27 during that same period, the percentage of water used by the agricultural segment did not. 
In fact, the number of irrigated acres in California saw a steady increase from 6.4 million acres in 
1950 to 9 million by the year 2000.  Claims made by McWilliams in 1949, like those of so many 
other historians and agricultural economists, were just as true in 2016 as they were then. 
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As early as 1878, McWilliams notes, California’s first State Engineer, William 
Hammond Hall, plainly stated that riparian rights would need to be addressed before any 
publicly funded water projects were to be considered. Because of the way riparian rights were 
recognized in California business interests and private parties who owned thousands of acres of 
land, like the Southern Pacific Company, Henry Miller, Charles Lux and Ben Haggin, were able 
to lay claim to water rights throughout much of the San Joaquin Valley, giving them a virtual 
monopoly on a resource without which the land was almost worthless. This is an important point, 
and one that McWilliams made repeatedly; because of the way land was distributed, purchased, 
or otherwise acquired, access to prime farmland and water was limited. Individuals that had 
access to water did not want to see changes made to land and water policy if it did not benefit 
them directly. It seems apparent to McWilliams that the Central Valley Project was built in a 
state already primed for misuse of water resources.   
Although some may argue with McWilliams’s evaluation of California economy and 
development as being in a constant state of boom, California has suffered its fair share of 
recessions and was especially hard hit in the 1990s, his analysis has been accurate over the long 
haul as the state has fluctuated in ranking amongst the top ten economies in the world from at 
least 2005-2015. The newest edition of his work would benefit from further analysis on 
contemporary economic and social issues related to the development of agricultural industry and 
water shortages, specifically agrarian labor and the increased poverty among some groups in the 
state. Addressing changes in these areas would link the history McWilliams presents with 
contemporary issues faced by many California residents.  
Much like McWilliams, Donald Worster points to the manner in which California 
developed as markedly influencing land and water policy in the state. As it grew, consequences 
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of such policy began to have a negative impact on social, economic, and political structures 
within the state. In Rivers of Empire, Worster makes the claim that the arid West followed a 
similar pattern of development as that described by Karl Wittfogel, German-born scholar of 
Chinese civilization, in his most noted work Oriental Despotism. California, according to 
Worster, is an example of Wittfogel’s “hydraulic society,” in which an agrarian culture is 
dependent upon government bureaucracies or elites with the means to build and maintain 
irrigation networks and flood controls. According to this theory, dependency upon large-scale 
water projects leads to monopolistic control of water, and thus to the agricultural economy by 
those in power while also establishing social stratification which maintains the balance of power 
toward the top. Although it is true that state and federal bureaucracies controlled access to water 
stored in reservoirs throughout California and social stratification within agricultural 
communities did occur, I would argue this had less to do with California being a hydraulic 
society and more to do with the capitalist system that Americans embraced. For this reason, 
California’s water crisis is more aligned with arguments Worster puts forth in Dust Bowl. 
An “absence of environmental realism” coupled with a desire for profit, which Worster 
says helped create the Dust Bowl that spread across the Great Plains, is also recognizable in 
California agriculture. Much like the expansion of wheat production during WWI, farmers in 
California turned fields of row crops into almond and pistachio orchards because of the market 
demand and potential for increased earnings. Even in the driest part of the San Joaquin Valley, 
farmers planted trees and grape vines using water from irrigation projects and aquifers with little 
concern for the impact this had on the environment, often until a crisis occurred. Moreover, like 
the farmers of the Southern Plain who saw the error of their ways in the 1930s only to do even 
more damage leading to the Filthy Fifties, California farmers had experienced droughts in the 
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past and yet endeavored to dominate their environment only to be dumbfounded when nature 
acted in accordance with natural laws. Both narratives indicate either a lack of understanding of 
how nature works or general disregard of the consequences. 
Worster determined that a lack of connection to the land, “the modern feeling of absolute 
free will and human autonomy,” and the general greed of people were the principle causes of the 
Dust Bowl. These same elements were apparent in modern California agriculture and were 
evidenced by the conflict over water resources and new laws regulating underground pumping.  
Even when problems were acknowledged and reforms were instituted to help conserve water for 
long-term use, both agribusinesses and small farmers often planted additional acres or turned to 
those which required water year round. Where Worster points out that constant growth meant 
that there would never be enough land to meet demands by Plains farmers, a parallel can be 
drawn between water usage and growth in the San Joaquin Valley.  
In addition, the economic and environmental damage that occurred during the Dust Bowl 
was, according to Worster, caused by the capitalist nature of American culture. Thus, “It (the 
Dust Bowl) came about because the culture was operating in precisely the way it was supposed 
to. Americans blazed their way across a richly endowed continent with a ruthless, devastating 
efficiency unmatched by any people anywhere.” Growth, progress, and a desire to dominate the 
environment and generate personal wealth had terrible consequences on the Southern Plains on 
more than one occasion, and similar problems occurred in California as well, albeit at a much 
slower rate and with less dire consequences for most residents. Without addressing the cultural 
and economic underpinnings that helped create the Dust Bowl, Worster maintains that another 
such disaster is inevitable. Given the current state of water resources in California, his warning 
should be taken seriously.  
 
 
7 
  
Chapter Two 
The Crisis at Hand: Pumping the Well Dry 
 
Figure 2.1 Dust Bowl. This is a sign along Interstate 5. In the distance grow rows of pistachio trees, 
while in the foreground the earth is dry and barren. Aside from the trees, the landscape is bleak as one 
would expect to see in a naturally arid region, and yet the sign would indicate that the dry earth was the 
fault of the government.         
                         
“Things are tough all over, cupcake, an' it rains on the just an' the unjust alike...except in 
California.”  
        -Alan Moore, Watchmen 
Beginning in 2011, and continuing through 2016, California faced the worst drought on 
record since it became a state in 1850. Exceptionally scant rainfall and mountain snowpack were 
only part of the problem Californians faced. Naturally occurring aquifers that many residents and 
farmers had relied upon during normal periods of aridity were no longer useable. In fact, some 
parts of the state experienced such sever water shortages that residents literally had no running 
water in their homes. The agricultural development of vast amounts of newly arable land and 
substantial population growth in California, especially along the coast and in the Central Valley, 
were also contributing factors to the water crisis. However, neither the expansion of farming, nor 
growth of urban areas could have occurred without access to a considerable amount of water in 
the first place. Thus, large-scale water projects allowed California to become both the most 
populated state in the Union and an agricultural powerhouse, but there were warnings early on 
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that mismanagement of water and unrestricted growth could lead to the very plight California 
began to suffer in 2011.
1
   
Although California had a vast system of aquifers providing significant water for farming 
and municipal use, this system was not enough to allow for the degree of expansion that had 
occurred in the southern half of the San Joaquin Valley.
2
 Urban growth placed a greater demand 
on water resources, as did the increasing numbers of family-owned farms.
3
 However, the vast 
majority of acres planted in the San Joaquin Valley, and thus the greatest burden to water 
resources in the driest part of the Valley, were owned by corporate farmers. In California, water 
acquisition by such farms had occurred without regard to the impact on smaller, less competitive 
farmers and rural residents. Instead, these farms expanded to the brink of sustainability and did 
so with publicly-funded water programs such as the Central Valley Project (CVP), the State 
Water Project (SWP), and by the overdraft of underground water sources. As California 
continued to face this historic drought, the entire state felt the pressures of water scarcity. 
                                                          
1
 Norris Hundly Jr., The Great Thirst: California and Water-A History (Rev. ed. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001). This extensive work traces the development of water resources 
from Native American irrigation networks through construction of modern, large-scale water projects of 
the twentieth century.  Hundly describes the rapid pace at which water projects were constructed and the 
tremendous growth of urban centers and agricultural development that occurred as a result. The Great 
Thirst serves as a warning to the residents of California, connecting early concerns over monopolization 
with problems regarding water quality and other environmental issues. More importantly, Hundly draws a 
connection to environmental problems, social inequality, and outdated laws in the state that allow for the 
mismanagement of water. He makes the case that reform in both urban development and agricultural use 
must be made to avoid a major crisis. 
2
 An aquifer is an underground layer of water-permeable rock, gravel, sand, or silt from which 
water can be drawn or pumped out to the surface. California has a large network of these that fill up from 
melting snowpack in the Sierra Nevada Mountains and from rainfall. For the past several decades aquifers 
have been pumped so frequently that they have become compacted. This means that they no longer 
function as an aquifer and reduce the amount of water available for use throughout the year.  
3
 Cities and towns have had to increase the amount of water used as populations have grown; 
however the percentage of water allocated for urban use has not increase. In fact, urban areas have often 
been the first places to reduce water consumption, and do so effectively, especially in California where 
recent water restrictions have even been exceeded by some urban populations.  
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Increased demands from both urban development and large-scale farms, beginning even prior to 
the 1950s, had placed an incredible strain on this already scarce resource.  
Even though this particular episode of drought is an extreme example, it should come as 
no surprise that water, or lack thereof it, has always been one of the most important topics when 
discussing the arid West.
4
 Control of water resources and who should have access to them has 
been debated since California entered the Union in 1850. Scholars have written extensively on 
water rights and how water has been relocated and distributed. Many historians have examined 
the Central Valley Project specifically and the impact this public work has had on development 
in the Central Valley.
5
 Although these historians have differing opinions as to who should have 
                                                          
4
 Water is essential for survival in the West. This is as true today as it was over one hundred years 
ago, only there are much higher financial stakes at risk. California has the eighth largest economy in the 
world, and without access to water for residents, a labor force, and business centers, none of this would be 
possible. (Agriculture currently makes up only about 2% of California’s GDP; however, about 60% of the 
state’s water goes to farming.)  
5
 Paul S. Taylor, “Central Valley Project:  Water and Land” The Western Political Quarterly 2, 
no. 2 (1949): 228-53. “The 160-Acre Limitation and the Water Resources Commission” The Western 
Political Quarterly 3, no. 3 (1950): 435-50. Taylor examined problems associated with land monopolies 
and social inequality noted in the early development of the state and how these issues persisted into the 
middle of the twentieth century. In essence, Taylor claims that the Central Valley Project benefited those 
who already had much and increased an already uneven distribution of wealth and power in the state.  
Robert de Roos, The Thirsty Land: The Story of the Central Valley Project (New York:  Greenwood 
Press, 1968). This work details issues surrounding funding and construction of the Central Valley Project. 
He explains the social, political, and economic concerns regarding construction of the Project and use of 
resources. William Kahrl, Water and Power: The Conflict Over Los Angeles (Berkeley:  University of 
California Press, 1982). An examination of the struggle over water use between urban and rural residents, 
Kahrl provides a national and regional context that lends meaning to the broader topic of the arid West. 
Donald J. Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness: The Irrigation Crusade in California and The 
West 1950-1981 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Pisani explains water and land policy in 
California including legal and political arguments regarding these policies. He claims that many believed 
irrigation would advance democracy in the West by affording an opportunity for small farmers only to see 
monopolies and speculation dominate the process.  Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, 
and the Growth of the American West (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1985). This work examines 
the growth of government controlled resources in the West, the relationship between man and his 
environment, and the social stratification in irrigation societies. Worster utilizes Karl Wittfogle’s theory 
of hydraulic society to describe the social, political, and bureaucratic structures in civilizations in which 
government bodies rather than local communities are in charge of irrigation networks. Dust Bowl: The 
Southern Plains in the 1930s (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1979).  Worster  makes a similar 
argument in this work about the disconnect between man and his environment and what role capitalism 
plays in this process. Mark Reisner, Cadillac Desert:  The American West and Its Disappearing Water 
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access to water and how much water they should receive, as well as who was to blame for the 
mismanaging of water resources, all agree that large landholders benefited the most from such 
projects.  Growers in the Southern San Juaquin Valley benefited considerably from water 
reclamation and redistribution in the Central Valley, via the CVP and the SWP, which allowed 
farms to expand in size and into areas that would have been impossible otherwise. In this case, 
water reclamation projects have had unintended consequences as they helped set the stage for 
water crises California has repeatedly experienced. The crisis Californians faced beginning in 
2011 highlights the significance of water needs in urban and rural development and the struggle 
to acquire and maintain access to dependable sources of water. This situation also underscored 
the impact water has on California’s economy, especially in the most arid regions and within 
specific communities. The economic impact can be linked directly to socioeconomic issues 
including concerns over quality healthcare, education, affordable housing, and the lack of 
political voice experienced by many California residents.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(New York:  Penguin Books, 1993). Much like Pisani’s claim that irrigation was supposed to revitalize 
the family farm but was instead usurped by big agriculture, Reisner points to the ineptitude of 
bureaucracies charged with managing water projects, claiming they aggravated economic, political, and 
environmental issues surrounding water development and use. Norris Hundly Jr., The Great Thirst: 
California and Water-A History (Rev. ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). This extensive 
work traces the development of water resources from Native American irrigation networks through 
construction of modern, large-scale water projects of the Twentieth Century.  Hundly explains that even 
though California has the most heavily engineered water networks in the world; managers of those 
networks did not address modern needs of the state nor made any real reform to areas that were already 
considered problematic. David P. Billington, Donald Conrad Jackson, and Martin V. Melosi, The History 
of Large Federal Dams:  Planning, Design, and Construction in the Era of Big Dams (Denver: U.S. 
Department of the Interior, 2005). This work tells the story of federal contributions to dam planning, 
design, and construction of specific dam sites in the United States. The authors also describe some of the 
negative social and environmental consequences of dam building. Ellen Hanak, Jay Lund, Ariel Dinar, 
Brian Gray, Richard Howitt, Jeffrey Mount, Peter Moyle, Barton Thompson, “Ch. 1 Floods, Droughts, 
and Lawsuits: A Brief History of California Water Policy” Managing California’s Water From Conflict to 
Reconciliation. (San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California, 2011). This work divides water 
management into different eras, describing each in relation to social, economic, and political arguments 
surrounding water projects and management.  
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 The purpose of this paper is to explore the historical context of California’s most recent 
water crisis in order to understand better the relationship between the growth of agribusiness in 
the state and the evolution of water policy. Terry L. Anderson, author of Water Crisis:  Ending 
the Policy Drought, defined an economic crisis as existing “when the quantity demanded is 
greater than the quantity available and when there is little time to adjust either of them.”6  This 
same formula can be applied to almost any nonrenewable resource and, in this case, can be 
applied to water.  In 1983, Anderson equated the “future” water crisis with the energy crisis of 
the 1970’s. For California, that future began in 2011.  Farmers, specifically those in the most arid 
regions of California’s Central Valley, began to see a considerable increase in the amount of 
water available for irrigation due to reclamation and diversion projects during the late 1930’s. 
Access to more irrigation waters meant an increase in agricultural production and potential 
profits from cultivation or land speculation, making the notion of planting more acres very 
enticing to those who were able to do so, especially in the midst of such challenging economic 
conditions. Unfortunately, many family farms in California were lost during the Depression as 
the state reached an unemployment rate of 28 percent by 1932, higher than the national average 
of 25 percent, with nearly one-fifth of the state’s residents receiving public relief by 1934. This 
meant limited funds for purchasing foodstuffs for average citizens making it difficult for farmers 
to pay their mortgages and other debts. Individuals that were able to hold on to their farmland 
were poised to make a fortune once New Deal programs were implemented, in most cases this 
                                                          
6
 Terry L. Anderson, Water Crisis:  Ending the Policy Drought. (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1983) p. 4.  In this book, Anderson blames resource economists and the inefficiency of 
bureaucrats for water issues in California and the arid West in general.  He claims that private investors 
had much more success in developing water diversion and containment systems and in distribution. His 
work minimizes the cost of larger, long-term structures that serve larger populations, funded by taxpayer 
dollars. 
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meant individuals with enough money to survive the economic collapse and who had already 
accumulated thousands of acres of grazing and farmland by the turn of the twentieth century. 
Thus, when irrigation water was made available in large quantities, such individuals saw 
increased productivity and profits from their lands.  
The augmented water supply was achieved through reclamation projects funded by public 
monies, namely the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project. Shifts in crop production 
and expansion into more arid parts of the Valley were primarily driven by the desire for 
increased profits by both large and small-scale farming operations.  Agribusinesses and large-
scale farms in particular continued to cultivate as many acres as possible and to plant crops that 
required more water than those that had traditionally been planted in this part of the Valley, 
consolidating land and making huge profits. This process was made possible because of access to 
federally subsidized water. However, due to the rate of growth and type of crops planted, many 
agribusinesses demanded that more and more water be made available even with the knowledge 
that episodes of drought are common in the Southern San Joaquin Valley. In addition, it is 
typical that those who owned and operated industrial farms had more money and political pull 
than those who ran traditional family farms, which has often allowed agribusinesses to influence 
water policy in order to get water they “needed,” intensifying episodes of water shortages and 
environmental problems. The impact of this type of usage has periodically been felt in local 
communities, specific geographic regions and, at times, across the entire state.   
There are several components to this argument, but all are linked to land being cultivated 
at a rate, in a manner, and in locations not suited for long-term agricultural sustainability.  
California has a long history of land consolidation and the consolidation of other resources at the 
hands of very few, very influential people, which has had long lasting ramifications concerning 
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land and water policy. First, those who own large tracts of land often had access to more water 
than those who had smaller farms. This water was usually acquired at a low-cost, except during 
the most extreme circumstances, as it was federally subsidized. Landowners with large tracts of 
land were usually in a better position to compete in local, state, national, and international 
markets. Access to inexpensive water gave them an even greater economic advantage than their 
smaller neighbors. Second, large landowners tended to be opposed to government regulation of 
resources, pesticide usage, wages, taxes, and environmental concerns. They also used their 
power and influence to keep water policy reforms off the table when possible; yet, they made 
millions of dollars each year via resources from publicly funded water programs. Third, 
agribusinesses were typically owned by investors for the sole purpose of making profits. 
Industrial farms have generally not been concerned with the types of crops they planted, 
pesticides they used, environmental impact they have had, or what impact their farming and 
labor practices have had on surrounding communities, as long as they did not suffer losses in 
revenue. This has usually been different for a family-owned and operated farm because the 
family lived in or near the community surrounding their land, thus, they could see and feel the 
impact their farming practices had. And, although it is the goal of both large and small-scale 
farms to make profits, customarily, family run farms also operated with the objective of keeping 
the land intact and fit for future generations to utilize for agricultural purposes.   
Throughout this thesis terms like, “corporate farms,” “agribusinesses,” “industrial farms”, 
and “large landholders” appear. I use these terms, as does the U.S. Census Bureau and Hoy 
Carmen, contributor to the Giannini Foundation, in order to identify a specific type and size of 
land holding and to clarify differences between those landholdings and smaller, typically family-
 
 
14 
  
owned and operated farms.
7
 The terms corporate farms and agribusinesses are interchangeable 
and refer to farms with an average of over 780 acres, with annual sales of more than $2,000,000, 
and with a market value of land and buildings of over $6,300,000. Family farms refer to land 
holdings which were on average 200 acres and had annual sales of around $162,000. Market 
value of the typical small or family farm, including land and structures, was estimated to be at 
about $1,292,000.
8
  These are twenty-first century figures, but will work for understanding the 
main arguments of the paper, especially when contemporary topics are introduced.  To be clear, 
family-owned farms can be thousands of acres in size and incorporated, and small farms might 
also be agribusinesses, however, for the purposes of this paper, family farm will be synonymous 
with small farm, under 500 acres, and also managed and worked by the family that owned the 
property. Regardless of size, farms in the San Joaquin Valley, if not located on or near a river, 
are likely to utilize water from manmade water networks such as the Central Valley Project or 
the State Water Project. 
The Central Valley Project--a series of dams, reservoirs, aqueducts, canals, and pumping 
stations--was proposed in 1933 as part of state and federal reclamation programs. The purpose of 
the CVP was to supply water-poor areas in the southern half of California’s Central Valley with 
irrigation and municipal water and to be a means of flood control throughout.
9
  By controlling 
surface water, the CVP also led to less reliance on ground water and allowed wells and aquifers 
                                                          
7
 “Farms and Farmland - The 2012 Statistical Abstract - U.S. Census Bureau.” Accessed October 
13, 2014. https://www.census.gov/.  Hoy Carman, “California Corporate farms:  Myth and Reality,” 
Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics: University of California,  http://giannini.ucop.edu/ 
8
 Hoy Carman pp. 9-11. These figures are from 2007 and are not adjusted for inflation or for 
market shifts.  
9
 Elizabeth Eiselen “The Central Valley Project:  1947,” Economic Geography, Vol. 23, no.1 
(Jan. 1947)   p.22-27.  The northern half of the valley often suffered flooding when riverbanks overflowed 
into towns and croplands. In order to make both halves of the valley more productive in both wet and dry 
years, engineers determined that waters from the Sacramento River could be diverted into the San Joaquin  
River, and the waters of the San Joaquin could be pumped back toward areas with less rainfall and 
sources of irrigation. 
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to recharge after dry periods.
10
 Thus, the CVP has largely been a success in regard to its intended 
purpose. Water has been stored and rerouted to areas with low precipitation, power stations have 
been constructed at several dam sites, and floodplains have been controlled and are used for crop 
production. Even though the project has come under fire in the past several decades due to 
negative environmental impact studies indicating damage along tributaries and in the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta, in recent years precautions have been taken to improve 
wildlife habitats and to ensure that natural environments are not altered further. Environmental 
concerns, which lead to periodic disputes over access to water especially during drought years, 
withstanding, the Central Valley Project is viewed, overall, as a positive endeavor.
11
  Yet, it is 
the very success of the CVP and the State Water Project which led to unsustainable agricultural 
growth in the arid southern half of the San Joaquin Valley and helped to create a water crisis in 
the state. 
The construction of the CVP allowed for easy access to irrigation water, which, in turn, 
helped increase the productivity of farms encouraging farmers to plant additional acres. With 
adequate water supplies, farming was seen as a good investment, especially in the fertile San 
Juaquin Valley, which, although it had long growing seasons, was previously limited as to the 
number of acres that could be brought under cultivation by the amount of water furnished by the 
                                                          
10
 Recharging refers to the replenishment of underground water sources via snowpack and 
rainwater runoff that refill the permeable layer of clay, sand, or sediment that makes up a particular 
aquifer.  In order for an aquifer to remain viable, there must be some level of water refilling it on a 
relatively consistent basis, or it will collapse and no longer be able to hold water. This also leads to land 
subsistence, which will be explained later in this paper.  
11
 “San Joaquin River Restoration Program,” California Department of Water Resources.  
Last modified August 4, 2009. http://www.water.ca.gov/rivers/sanjoaquin/program/ This is one example 
of the many programs to improve ecosystems dependent upon rivers in California.  There are several 
other articles pertaining to such programs under the Environment tab on the Department of Water 
Resources website. In addition, it has become clear to urban and rural residents alike that it is in their best 
interest to keep the environment as healthy as possible. Ramifications of changing water quality and the 
fluctuation in the number of certain animal populations and plant species have been observed all along the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers, out to the Delta.   
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Kern and Kings Rivers. On average, annual runoff for the Kings river has been 1,745,000 acre-
feet per year and the Kern typically carries 700,000 acre-feet per year, during dry seasons there is 
not, nor has there ever been, enough water to irrigate the more than two million acres of 
farmland in Kern County alone.
12
 The burden of supplying water to expanding farmland, along 
with increased populations in rural and urban areas, led to an expansion of the CVP well into the 
1970’s, including construction of new dams, canals, and power stations. Expansion of the SWP 
also occurred for the same reasons. Even in 2016, much of the water from these public works 
went directly to large-scale farms in the driest part of the Valley.
13
 In order to facilitate the 
redirection of water to the southern half of California, part of the Sacramento River was diverted 
so that it flowed into the San Joaquin River. This allowed waters from the San Joaquin to be 
rerouted back upstream through a series of canals in order to irrigate Kings, Tulare, and Kern 
counties. These counties were in the top five producers of agricultural goods in California 
between 2005 and 2016, which would have been nearly impossible without water from publicly 
funded water programs. This would have been especially true during the years of drought.  
                                                          
12
 R.H. Dale, James J. French, and G.V. Gordon, “Ground-Water Geology and Hydrology of the 
Kern River Alluvial-Fan Area, California.”  California Department of Water Resources (Menlo Park, 
California: 1966)  http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1966/0021/report.pdf.   Acre-feet refers to the volume of water 
necessary to cover one acre of land with one foot of water.  
13
 Lawrence B. Lee, “California Water Politics: Opposition to the CVP, 1944-1980.”  
Agricultural History 54, no. 3 (July 1, 1980): 411-417.  Lee examines the shifts in agriculture and water 
use caused by military production during WWII.  He also explains opposition to increased building on the 
CVP by various groups and the reasons for that opposition. 
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Figure 2.2 CVP. Aqueducts constructed for the CVP usually run parallel to the rivers This map shows 
many of the water systems which have allowed for expansion of both farming and urban development.   
 
California has seen a fair number of droughts in the past century which lasted longer than 
the 2011 drought. However, this situation was different from previous episodes due to the 
unprecedented lack of rainfall occurring across the state. Also, specific regions in the Central 
Valley receive varying amounts of precipitation even under normal conditions, making some 
parts of the Valley more suitable for farming than others. The Central Valley can be divided into 
three segments with differing amounts of precipitation and average temperatures. The upper third 
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consists of the Sacramento River and surrounding areas. Different parts of this third can receive 
anywhere from 17 to 40 inches of rainfall each year, with Sacramento reaching an average of 58 
days of rainfall annually.
14
 This part of the Valley also has more rivers and runoff from mountain 
snowpack in the warmer months than the other two thirds. The San Joaquin River runs through 
the northern part of the San Joaquin Valley and receives about seventeen inches of rainfall 
annually with growing seasons all through the year for different crops.
15
 The southern half of the 
San Joaquin Valley is the most arid, receiving between three and 5.7 inches of rain per year and 
has the fewest natural waterways in the entire Valley.
16
 However, even in the driest counties, 
such as Kern, the soil was excellent for farming and it was only lack of precipitation and ability 
to utilize ephemeral water supplies that limited agricultural development here.                                                                                                                              
Beginning in 2011, California experienced a reduction in annual rainfall statewide.  
Sacramento received 31 percent of its annual average, Fresno 36 percent, and in 2015 alone, 
Bakersfield saw a 40 percent reduction in annual precipitation, from the average of 4.3 to 2.75 
inches of rainfall.
17
  This lack of surface water impacted the amount of water available for 
storage in reservoirs and pumping stations across the state. Coupled with less snowpack in the 
Sierra Nevadas, this meant less runoff during the dry seasons and less groundwater recharge for 
wells and aquifers. Unfortunately, less surface water also meant more reliance on groundwater, 
                                                          
14
 “Ground Water Atlas of the Unites States, Central Valley Aquifers” United States Geological 
Survey, last modified February 9, 2009. http://pubs.usgs.gov/ha/ha730.  This digital resource provides 
detailed information on how the Central Valley basin works. Descriptions of underground and above- 
ground water flow, mountain runoff and valley drainage are also presented. Pre and post groundwater 
flow systems are analyzed and ground subsidence issues are explained.  
15
 Paul Vossen. “California Climate Zones for Growing Temperate Tree Fruits and Nuts,” 
Growing Temperate Fruit and Nut Trees in the Home Garden.  UC Davis, 2014. 
http://homeorchard.ucdavis.edu 
16
 Devin Galloway and Francis S. Riley “San Joaquin Valley, California:   
Largest Human Alteration of the Earth’s Surface.” U.S. Geological Survey. Menlo Park, CA. 
pubs.usgs.gov   
17
 California Department of Water Resources. Last modified August 4, 2009.   
http://www.water.ca.gov/rivers/sanjoaquin/program/ 
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which had not been able to recharge properly since the drought began.  As a consequence, 
groundwater levels began dropping consistently with each drought cycle California experienced. 
Not including the 2011 episode; California has experienced six periods of drought since 1959: 
1959-1962, 1976-1977, 1987-1992, 2000-2002, and 2007-2009.  Water restrictions have been 
imposed on various regions throughout the state whenever scarcity occurred; however, no 
significant change in policy had been established to limit the impact insufficient water supplies 
had on the state as of 2016. Nor were long-term solutions suggested for continued use of 
underground water systems, although new legislation did pass in 2015 to regulate subterranean 
pumping, which were depleted during every dry season and major drought.  
Prior to the construction of the CVP, farmers and residents of cities and towns in the 
southern San Joaquin Valley relied on groundwater as a dependable source; many continued to 
do so.
18
 Despite construction of the CVP beginning in the late 1930’s, irrigation in the Southern 
San Joaquin Valley was almost entirely furnished by ground water before 1968. According to the 
U.S. Geological Survey, by 1955 the San Joaquin Valley accounted for one-fourth of the 
groundwater used for irrigation in the entire country.
19
 However, groundwater alone was not 
sufficient to support the more than 26 million acres of farmland in production in California in 
2014; controlled surface water was necessary for this. The precipitation and agriculture maps 
shown below illustrate just how much agricultural development occurred in the southern half of 
                                                          
18
 Senator Sheridan Downey, They Would Rule the Valley (San Francisco, Kessinger Publishing, 
LLC, 1947). p.32-35. Senator Downey was vehemently opposed to construction on the CVP.  He was 
especially opposed to the 160-acre limitation, citing that large farmers would not need access to CVP 
water so the limit was unnecessary and arbitrary. He claimed that these farmers typically used aquifers for 
irrigation and public monies should not be used to continue construction that would primarily benefit a 
few private individuals.  The long-term consequences of reliance on aquifers on agriculture and 
economies in the region seem not to have factored into his argument.  
19
 Galloway, p.28-29. 
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the San Joaquin Valley. Interestingly, there appears to be an inverse relationship between 
precipitation and agriculture in the state.  
Prec   
 
Figure 2.3 Precipitation and Agriculture. Precipitation in the southern half of the Central Valley is 
inversely related to farm production.
20
 These images indicate that in the driest part of the Valley the most 
acres are used for agriculture. The red, light pink and white are used to show very low amounts of 
precipitation in the map on the left. In the image to the right, the brown color is used to show agriculture, 
much of which corresponds to the dry area on the left. 
 
As of 2016, the CVP provided irrigation water to 3 million acres of farmland and the 
SWP supported 600,000 which should have helped to alleviate ground water dependence, but 
farmers in the Valley also used the supplemental water supplies to irrigate additional acres as 
soon as they were able to do so. In the 1970’s farm expansion was encouraged by the Secretary 
of Agriculture Earl Butz in an effort to meet growing demand for agricultural products 
                                                          
20
 Management Landscapes FRAP Maps. Department of Forestry and Fire Protection,  State of 
California, 2014.   http://frap.fire.ca.gov/ 
 
 
21 
  
worldwide and to expand America’s presence in the global marketplace.21 This boom in the 
agricultural sector was, like so many other booms in American history, a precursor to over 
production and eventual bust.  Industrial farms, which Butz supported due to perceived 
efficiencies and sheer quantity of production, eagerly embraced expansion and use of the newly 
“freed up” water supply. In this case the solution for aiding in the recharge of depleted aquifers 
actually made the problem worse as it was not used for the intended purpose but rather to put 
more land into production and make more money for agribusinesses. Thus, the issue of depleted 
aquifers remained a problem for California even after reservoirs, canals, and other water 
redistribution networks were put into use.  
Even after construction of public water systems was completed, farmers relied on water 
from aquifers during episodes of drought. Rural residents all over the state often depended upon 
wells to meet their daily water needs, tapping aquifers for municipal use even though water from 
the CVP and SWP provided resources to nearly 22 million residents in 2015. As more and more 
water was diverted into the CVP and SWP, less water made it back into aquifers to recharge and 
allow water tables to rise. As a result, wells had to be dug even deeper in the Valley. On average, 
wells had a yield of 1,000 gallons per minute, about 800 gallons per minute in Sacramento and 
an average of 1,100 in the San Joaquin Valley. Historically, well depths in the Sacramento 
Valley have been less than 500 feet; many measured less than 300 feet.
22
 Some wells could be 
found with depths that did not even reach 40 feet in depth. However, by 2015, at least five wells 
used for irrigation in the San Joaquin Valley were at a depth of 3,500 feet.
23
 Wells deeper than 
500 feet were expensive and difficult to drill, making some small farmers and rural inhabitants 
                                                          
21
 Tom Philpot, “A Reflection on the Lasting Legacy of 1970s USDA Secretary Earl Butz,” The 
Grist, February 8, 2000. http://grist.org/article/the-butz-stops-here/  
22
 William Kahrl, Water and the Power: The Conflict over Los Angeles. (Berkeley:  University of 
California Press, 1982),  p.6. 
23
 Ibid. 
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reluctant or unable to drill newer or deeper wells. In some cases, the value of water for irrigation 
or private use was insufficient to offset the cost of drilling and putting in a new pump.  
Even for municipal use well depths began to be problematic. For example, in Davis, 
California, located in the northern part of the valley, well levels dropped steadily since the 2011 
drought began and eventually surpassed the lowest levels reached in the 1977 drought, dropping 
21 feet in 2013 alone.
24
 Well levels dropped even more dramatically in the San Joaquin Valley. 
Due to dependence on groundwater through the 1960s, wells in this part of the state were 
depleted by roughly 200 feet. Groundwater did have time to recharge once surface water was 
available for irrigation, but droughts from 1976-77 and again from 1987-1991 led to a loss of 
150 feet during each episode.
25
  Less than average rainfall and mountain runoff left aquifers even 
lower and there was not adequate recharge in the early 2000s to bring the water table up to 
normal levels. (Traditionally, aquifers were recharged from annual runoff from the Sierra 
Nevada Mountains, maintaining good quality and dependable water.) Unfortunately, in 2013, 
CVP officials stated that they would not be releasing water to farmers; the following year the 
SWP came to the same decision, leading once more to dependence on underground sources 
statewide and exacerbation of the problem.
26
  
                                                          
24
 Elizabeth Case, “Well Levels Drop Around the County As Drought Presses On,” Davis 
Enterprise (Davis, California), September 12, 2014. 
25
 Galloway, p31. 
26
 Lisa M. Krieger, “California Drought:  San Joaquin Valley Sinking As Farmers Race To Tap 
Aquifer,” San Jose Mercury News (San Jose, California), March 29, 2014. 
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Figure 2.4 Rush to drill. This graph, from an article by Elizabeth Case, writer for the Davis Enterprise, 
shows the sudden increase in both depth and number of wells drilled in the San Joaquin Valley. The 
number of wells being dug deeper or in new areas continued to increase through 2016, as water tables 
dropped statewide, not just in the San Joaquin Valley. 
 
Not surprisingly, in 2013, the number of permits for new wells increased in almost every 
county in the San Joaquin Valley. In Madera, the number of well permits increased from 300 to 
410. Fresno saw the number of new permit requests rise from just fewer than 300 in 2011 to 739, 
and Tulare County saw the largest increase with permit requests growing from 400 in 2011 to 
831.
27
 As water levels dropped dramatically in the southern half of the Valley, very deep wells 
were drilled, which cost farmers anywhere from $200,000-$600,000.
28
 The number of new well 
permits for residential use was higher than usual in 2014, with 124 in Fresno and 182 in Tulare 
counties. At least five new wells in Kern County reaching 2,500 feet in depth were drilled by 
2016.
 29
  There were so many demands for new or deeper wells that many drilling companies 
found they could not meet the demands and gave out wait times to all new requests. Pump repair 
                                                          
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid.   
29
Vance Kennedy, Retired U.S. Geological Survey hydrologist; his perspective on water use in 
the Central Valley can also be found on The Valley Citizen http://thevalleycitizen.com/ 
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companies faced the same dilemma, and often had to tell pump owners that it is not the pump 
that needed to be repaired or replaced, but that the well needed to be deeper. 
30
  
Aquifers in different parts of the Central Valley are linked, so as more water is withdrawn 
for agricultural use, residential water goes with it. It is like having too many straws in a glass, 
with a few sucking out the water much faster and more frequently than everyone else.  Vance 
Kennedy, retired U.S. Geological Survey hydrologist, summed it up this way: “People don’t 
know, or don’t care, that they are also pulling water from thousands of feet around them.”31 
Consequently, the largest number of new well requests was for private rural residences as old 
pumps could no longer reach depleted water levels. An increase in the number of water storage 
tanks purchased by private residents in rural areas also occurred as some wells dried up 
altogether or became too deep and expensive to manage.
32
  Nick Beard, owner and operator of 
Wallace M. Beard Pump Co., Inc., says that wells in Yolo County began to dry up in May of 
2014.  Beard noticed an increase in calls to repair pumps for domestic and agricultural use as 
early as 2008, only to find it was the well depth that needed to be altered not a malfunctioning 
pump that was the culprit.   
Another issue for farmers regarding well depth occurred as borane salt levels increased in 
irrigation wells, and even deeper wells were needed to get better quality water for certain crops 
like olive trees.  On average, stated Beard, domestic wells in Yolo County have increased to a 
depth of 320 feet, whereas the well on his property was drilled to a depth of 200 feet in 1977, 
which was during a drought, so even that level is not indicative of normal levels.
33
 As with other 
                                                          
30
 Nick Beard, Wallace M. Beard Pump Co., Inc., Woodland, California. Interviewed by Tracy 
Neblina on September 12, 2014. Beard has been a family owned business operating out of Woodland, 
CA, for over twenty years. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Galloway, and Nick Beard interview. 
33
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pumping companies, Beard had had more requests than he could accommodate in a timely 
manner during the drought, so he began referring clients to competitors when necessary. Mr. 
Beard found himself working seven days a week, sometimes ten to fifteen hours a day due to the 
number of residents and farmers scrambling to get potable water out of their ever deepening 
wells. It was not the first time that drought had occurred in Yolo County, however, the degree of 
the 2011 episode was shocking to many residents as the county is located in the northern half of 
the Central Valley where rainfall is usually plentiful as are surface and groundwater supplies. 
Residents that rely on the Sacramento River and its tributaries are finding it difficult to 
rationalize sending water to a desert in the south to sustain farms when they are now struggling 
to keep water in their own homes.  
Most everyone involved with water use on a large-scale knew that deeper wells and 
continuous reliance on groundwater were not long-term solutions. In fact, overuse of aquifers 
often led to soil subsidence, aquifer-system compaction, increased soil salinity, and lower quality 
surface water. All of these problems had a profoundly negative impact on the very farms that 
used water from the wells in the first place. Some experts believed underground water stores 
would be used up in the next few decades.
34
 Director of the University of California, Irvine, 
Center for Hydrologic Modeling, Jay Famiglietti estimated that underground reserves in the 
Central Valley “are shrinking by 800 billion gallons a year…” Depleted underground water 
sources directly impacted farmers but were caused, in part, by the farmers themselves. The cycle 
of overuse and continued planting during dry seasons and drought years was driven by the desire 
for increased profits; this was especially troubling in the arid half of San Joaquin Valley where 
agribusinesses controlled a great deal of land. Family-run farms often followed suit to remain 
                                                          
34
 Jay Famiglietti, “How Much Water Does California Have Left?” Los Angeles Times, July 8,  
2014. Famiglietti is a professor at UC Irvine. He is the founder and director of UC Center for Hydrologic 
Modeling. His outlook on water availability for California is bleak, but he is not alone in this assessment.  
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competitive in the national and global markets, and of course make their own profits. Such 
practices placed a strain on the entire state and did not address the underlying cause of water 
shortage or misuse and sometimes led to the collapse aquifers and land subsidence in the Central 
Valley. The photograph below shows what happens when aquifers are depleted and indicates the 
level of compaction that had already occurred in the Central Valley prior to 1977.  An illustration 
on the following page shows what happens below the surface when compaction occurs such as 
that shown in the image of Dr. Poland. Clearly this issue was not new to California, yet it was 
still a problem when another drought began in 2011. 
 
Figure 2.5 Subsistence. This image shows how far land collapsed in one part of the San Joaquin Valley 
between 1925 and 1977. To the right grow grapevines, a crop that requires water year round and cannot 
be fallowed without losing the vines.
35
 This image indicates an awareness of situation as early as 1955. 
The drop in levels is due to compacted or collapsed aquifer which means water which used to flow under 
these rows of grapevines no longer exists. Farmers in this area would have needed to dig deeper wells 
and/or get more waters from public water networks. Given that these areas continued to see land 
subsistence between 1977 and 2015, it can be inferred that even more aquifers have collapsed, reducing 
underground water sources still further.  The fact that this issue was ongoing from 1925 to 2016 should 
give California residents pause because the availability of water from the CVP, SWP, and local water 
diversion projects had not ended the overdraft of subterranean water supplies and aquifer depletion.   
 
 
                                                          
35
 D. Galloway,  “San Joaquin Valley, California: Largest Human Alteration of the Earth’s 
Surface” United States Geological Survey, 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1182/pdf/06SanJoaquinValley.pdf.  
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Figure 2.6 Sinking Ground. Used in an article about land subsidence, this image shows what happens 
when aquifers are depleted without chance for normal recharge. It helps to explain what has occurred in 
the previous photo of Dr. Poland standing next to the pole with subsistence markers dating back to 1925. 
The impact is profound and long-term as once the clay or other permeable level is compacted and 
collapsed it can never hold water again.  
 
 Although lack of water resources was nothing new for California, due to the increased 
number of residents depending upon depleted water sources for both agricultural production and 
domestic needs, calls for water regulation reached a fever pitch. It appeared that California 
residents were reticent to the fact that solutions addressing these issues would not be simple, nor 
would they please all involved in the process, but the task could be made clearer by looking at 
the historical link between land and water. Indeed, the water crisis in California was tied directly 
to the history of land and water management in the state and the desire for increased wealth by 
agribusinesses and small farmers alike. Patterns of land acquisition that occurred prior to 
California entering the Union persisted into the twenty-first century, and had a profound impact 
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on water usage for both farming and urban development.  Thus, in order to understand the 
dilemma concerning water California has faced periodically throughout its history, it is also 
important to understand the early patterns of land acquisition and development.  It is equally 
important to understand that water rights, storage, and flood control were an integral part in the 
development of large and small-scale farms across the state  
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Chapter Three 
Land Monopolies and Family Farms: Setting the Stage for Crisis 
“The great estates of that region are doomed to disintegration. The great wheat ranch 
cannot compete with the small diversified farm. In agriculture the big fish are furnishing food for 
the little ones.”36           
-Dr. Charles B. Spahr 
 
The history of water reclamation and the influence of money, land, and power in Central 
California began long before construction of large public water works, such as the Central Valley 
Project, were even conceived. As mining began to decrease in the late 1860’s, the number of 
farms began to increase. At roughly the same time, the Southern Pacific Company began 
construction on a railroad through the San Joaquin Valley.
37
 This rail line supplanted 
transportation of crops by river to markets and ports, and created new connections where rivers 
did not exist, allowing towns and farming communities to grow in places where there were 
railroad stations. By 1874, the Southern Pacific (SP) stopped in Modesto, Tulare, Delano, Fresno 
and Bakersfield, to name but a few. The newly constructed railroad also opened up opportunities 
                                                          
36
 Richard Theodore Ely. Monopolies and Trusts. (New York:  The Macmillan Company, 1906), 
p. 193. In this book, Ely examines the meaning of monopoly, the economic and social implications, and 
issues with trusts that create monopolies. A simple evaluation of his assessment is that if issues with 
natural monopolies are eliminated, such as consolidation of wealth, social privileges, etc., there would be 
no problems with trusts. I use the quote by Dr. Charles B. Spahr , chairman of the Anti-Imperialist 
League of New York from 1900-1904, because it shows how large farms from Minnesota to South 
Dakota were seen as a temporary phenomenon. This runs contrary to the way farming occurred in 
California.  
37
 Donald J. Pisani.  From the Family Farm to Agribusiness:  The Irrigation Crusade in 
California and the West, 1850-1931. (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1984), p. 102-103. Pisani 
is a professor of Western American History at the University of Oklahoma and has written several books 
on the topics of water, land, and law in California.  Born and raised in Sacramento, Pisani has firsthand 
experience with the effects of land and water policy in California.  In this work, Pisani explains how 
“irrigation contributed to the evolution of California agriculture from the pastoral and wheat boom era,” 
to the large agribusinesses that control the most farm acres in the state. He also argues that water was not 
just about farming and making a living but a means to control social and economic development in 
California.  The mismanagement of resources at the local, state, and federal levels and how this 
contributed to land and water issues are also important elements of his argument.  Similarly, his 2002 
book, Water and the American Government, highlights the way in which water reclamation projects fall 
prey to local interest groups and the inability of the federal government effectively to manage resources.  
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for business endeavors in the new towns and for farmers across the Valley, even into areas not 
supported by readily available water. Due to both the productivity of the land and proximity to 
the railroad, real estate values around Fresno and Porterville, located in the center of the San 
Joaquin Valley between the San Joaquin River and Kings River, increased to a steep 150 dollars 
an acre.
38
 This made land purchases for small farmers difficult to say the least, and many of 
those looking to make money by farming in the fertile Valley found themselves limited to 
purchases of land further down into Kern County, an area with far less readily available water.  
Agricultural development did not occur in isolation, in fact there was a great deal of 
urban development in California, with nearly one quarter of the population living in San 
Francisco, and several other cities, like Sacramento, Oakland, San Jose, and Los Angeles each 
had populations of 10,000 residents.
39
 Growing metropolitan areas created a greater demand for 
crops and livestock, and with the railroad now established, this meant farming in the state could 
be highly profitable, inspiring the migration of many would-be farmers. Facilitated by 
construction of the railroad, the rapid growth of towns and cities, and the value of land for 
agricultural development or speculation, it was possible for ordinary men to build great wealth in 
many parts of the West.  In 1888, Englishman James Bryce wrote The American Commonwealth, 
in which he noted just such a trend, particularly in California, where a number of men who had 
come from relatively little, had amassed great fortunes.
40
 This, he noted was most apparent in 
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urban centers but had far reaching consequences for rural areas where farms of “enormous size” 
were leased to numerous farmers by land speculators or owned by land barons who hired 
seasonal labor.
41
 California was unique in this way as most states had farms of more modest size 
and families lived and worked on the land themselves. Most importantly, because there was not 
typically a direct connection to the land on the part of the land owners and because the 
fundamental goal was to make money, there was no sense of stewardship. Individuals felt that 
they were entitled to do what they liked with their property regardless of what happened to 
others, especially if their own interests were at stake. This was seen by many as part and parcel 
of expansion, progress, and full entry of the state into the market economy. Unfortunately, this 
model persisted, with few exceptions, as did the consequences well into the twenty-first century. 
Initially, this model of expansion was bolstered by large transportation projects that 
linked towns to markets near and far, especially rail lines. By the time the Southern Pacific 
Railroad had completed lines through the San Joaquin Valley, much of the land had already been 
accumulated by a few wealthy individuals who often fit the description presented by James 
Bryce. For example, Henry Miller & Charles Lux, who owned hundreds of thousands of acres 
crossing three states, even granted a right of way through land near Gilroy to the SP in exchange 
for an extension line to their Bloomfield Farm for which they secured very low shipping rates for 
transporting cattle to market.
42
 This arrangement helped Miller & Lux become the controlling 
interest in the in the beef industry for San Francisco and surrounding areas. In his 1975 article, 
“Public Land Disposal in California,” Paul W. Gates, historian and authority on federal land 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
41
 Ibid., 234-235. 
42
 David Igler, Industrial Cowboys:  Miller and Lux and the Transformation of the Far West. 
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2001) p. 53. Igler argues that land and resource acquisition in 
California was an industrial and capitalistic endeavor. He uses Henry Miller and Charles Lux as prime 
examples of the process of consolidation of land and power in the state, with a uniquely “Western” flair. 
Igler also asserts that the methods used for this process have continued to plague residents of California.   
 
 
32 
  
policy, points out that several large rancheros were purchased in similar fashion by Anglos like 
Thomas O. Larkin, John Bidwell, and Abel Stearns.
43
 Construction of railroads lines near their 
farms not only gave owners a leg up on competition and reduced transportation costs for getting 
crops and livestock to markets, but it also helped build long-term connections with investors and 
transportation moguls that other farmers were not able to establish. Railroad lines cut across the 
state directly through the Central Valley, as indicated in the map below from the 1870s, which 
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allowed landowners in the fertile valley to transport goods to market more easily, further 
increasing the value of the land.  
 
Figure 3.1 Railroad Map. This map shows the major lines of the Southern Pacific Rail Road in 
California and surrounding area to accompany printed agreement of S. O. Houghton as to the rights of the 
Southern Pacific R.R. Co. of Cal. to government lands under Acts of Congress passed July 27, 1866 and 
March 3, 1871 made before the committee of the judiciary of the Senate and Ho. of Reps. in May 1876. If 
compared to other maps showing the landholdings of several land barons, it is clear that the lines go 
directly or very near their estates.  
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Eventually, this elite group of California landholders was joined by men who had 
recently made their fortunes in banking, shipping, mining, cattle ranching, and railroads, like 
Miller & Lux.
44
  Most of these men had ties to land offices and banking interests in San 
Francisco which facilitated acquisition of Mexican land via the appropriate “legal” channels.45 
John Parrott, land broker, mining investor, and money lender operating out of San Francisco, 
assisted in many of the land deals via his Parrott and Company Banking Exchange and Agency 
founded in 1855. Because of this, land granted by the Mexican government moved more quickly 
into the hands of American landowners in California than it did in Texas and other parts of the 
southwest, and impacted the way in which the economy and state land policy developed. 
Poorly drawn state and federal land laws also helped create and perpetuate land 
monopolies in California. In fact, members of the Kern County Land Company had a heavy hand 
in the 1877 Desert Land Act and were able to purchase thousands of acres due to the wording 
they helped craft. Land ownership was the means to establishing control over resources in the 
state, for extraction or transportation to markets, which required a lot of capital, thus, such 
endeavors tended to be carried out by men with large-scale operations. Furthermore, the sale of 
public lands in other states was limited to areas that had already been surveyed, although the Pre-
emption Act of 1841 technically provided a solution for dealing with those who settled on land 
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not yet open for sale. Prospective buyers in such states could file a claim with the Land Office 
requesting purchase of between 40 and 640 acres. In contrast, no such office was established in 
California until 1858.
46
 In addition, the cost of surveying land was placed on the buyer even 
though this land was also seventy-five cents more expensive than that of surveyed land in other 
states. Individuals that wished to purchase more than the maximum number of acres were simply 
required to fill out forms stating that the purchase would serve as a permanent residence.
47
 
However, residency rules were seldom enforced which allowed for wealthy bankers to remain in 
cities like San Francisco as absentee owners. All of these conditions served to undermine 
settlement by small farmers establishing agricultural communities, but instead propagated the 
growth of agricultural empires.  
To make matters worse, President James Buchanan also attempted to remedy fiscal issues 
faced by the Nation after a depression in 1857 by putting 11,000,000 acres of California land on 
the market. Gates explains that some of the land was very desirable, but, due to the recent 
depression, few had enough money to purchase land and so the price dropped to $1.25 an acre, 
the national averages ranged from $5-$18 an acre. Those who had money and connections were 
allowed to purchase unlimited amounts of this land with cash, devalued military bounty warrants 
or other forms of scrip.
48
  Unfortunately, this land was off limits to homesteaders and pre-
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emptioners alike, even after passage of the Homestead Act of 1862. This meant that most 
yeomen farmers or prospective land owners of modest means found it almost impossible to 
afford land even at the lower prices. Again, men with ties to bankers in San Francisco were able 
to purchase land using scrip in what appeared to be limitless quantities. When land did become 
available for purchase or homestead, settlers found the best land hand already been claimed.
49
 In 
short, control of good quality farmland, and a lot of it, fell into the hands of a few individuals 
which further established agricultural monopolies in California.  
 Of equal importance was the fact that laws put in place to safeguard small farmers were 
generally disregarded, allowing for landholdings to become even more concentrated in 
California. For instance, in 1841 President John Tyler had signed into law the Log Cabin Bill. 
The intent of this legislation was to protect the rights of “preemptors” or squatters who had gone 
onto federal lands prior to public release and made improvements to that land just as any 
homesteader was required to do.
50
 In other states preemptors could file a claim and make 
payment on the land they had improved and gain title to a certain number of acres. In California, 
petitions by preemptors were seldom upheld, and they usually lost all investment they had made 
in improving the land while waiting for homestead measures to pass. However, those with means 
were represented with great success when making claims against preemptors and families that 
had been granted land rights by the Mexican government. In some cases, families had settled on 
land not yet open to the public and made improvements in hopes that when the Log Cabin Bill 
took effect they would be able to buy it. Unfortunately, the improvements were used when 
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evaluating the property value and the family that had worked the land was seldom able to afford 
it at auction; instead land barons added these improved farmlands to their already sizable 
holdings.
51
 A report by the California State Board of Agriculture in 1872, showed just how 
extensive land consolidation was in the state. According to the report one hundred people held 
titles to roughly 5,460,000 acres and in the San Joaquin Valley alone, three individuals each 
claimed an average in excess of 235,000 acres.
52
 
Still another issue that allowed for land and agriculture monopolies was that the law was 
on the side of wealthy landowners in practice, if not in fact. Squatters could seldom afford court 
costs or hire lawyers with the same skill as could men like Henry Miller and Charles Lux, who 
acquired 300,000 acres just from the sale of rancheros. In contrast, Gates gives the example of a 
would-be homesteader that was displaced on two separate occasions. Robert Fulton Jr. had 
settled on land that was part of the Mexican claims after the Mexican American War. Because of 
this, he was force to leave land he had already begun improvements on. He relocated, and this 
time he filed a claim before he began improvements on the land. However, it was not until after 
he had started the improvements that he was told there was a state warrant filed on what he 
thought was his property.
53
 Episodes like this demonstrated just how little the law applied to men 
with influence and how hopeless small farmers and homesteaders must have felt given that 
almost twenty-five percent of the land in the San Joaquin Valley was owned by less than one 
percent of the landholders, most of whom lived outside of the Valley.
54
 Much of that twenty-five 
percent was also prime farmland near rivers and with relatively easy access to rail lines running 
vertically across the state. Henry Miller, for example, owned much of the land along the San 
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Joaquin, Kern, and San Benito Rivers in California, a bit more near Walker Lake in Nevada and 
further north in Winnemucca and surrounding area, and even some up along the Silvies River in 
Oregon. Red areas on the map below indicate just how much land Miller owned across three 
states, most located adjacent to sources of water, and he is but one of a handful of men who 
owned so much prime land in California.  
 
Figure 3.2 Miller Land Holdings: Map of Henry Miller Land Holdings from Edward F. Treadwell, The 
Cattle King, A Dramatized Biography (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931) Miller, known as the “Cattle 
King”, was an immigrant butcher who eventually became one of the largest cattle suppliers in the state, 
owned land across three states. Land used for farming and cattle ranching is denoted in red.  Miller helped 
to develop much of the southern San Joaquin Valley, and he and Charles Lux established on of the largest 
agricultural empires in California, eventually dabbling in irrigation projects as well. Courtesy of the 
Library of Congress, public domain.  
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Several other schemes allowed for those with money and connections to obtain land not 
available to the average citizen. Policy regarding swampland purchase helped perpetuate 
monopolies in California that remained intact where other states saw such monopolies broken 
up.
55
 Holders of swampland warrants were allowed to purchase more land at a lower price as it 
was understood that swampland was less valuable or would require more investment than dry 
land in order to be made useable. For this reason, swampland tended to be unappealing for most 
yeoman farmers with little extra capital to invest in land reclamation on their own. What most 
homesteaders were not initially aware of however was that the land purchasers themselves were 
able to determine what parts of the unsurveyed lands were considered swampy and which were 
dry.
56
  An additional perk of this system was that speculators who purchased land with a 
swampland warrant were able to avoid payment for years due to lax enforcement within the 
state.
57
 As such, large tracts were purchased by a few individuals privy to this information, 
leading to increased monopolistic landholdings.  
The consequences of unethical land dealings did not go unnoticed, but little was done to 
curtail the activity. U.S. Surveyor General for California, Sherman Day, warned that the system 
in use allowed too much land to be procured by too few people without the proper protection for 
actual homesteaders.
58
 Despite this warning, Will S. Green, a large landowner in the Sacramento 
Valley and recently elected member of the California State Legislature, sponsored a bill that 
eliminated any restrictions that still applied to swampland purchases. The bill, which allowed 
land holders to pay only the 10 percent interest on land they owned or wished to purchase, 
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passed unanimously.
59
 Once the machinations of such land purchases became known, it was not 
lost on the public that the passage of this bill worked to the benefit of those who already owned 
considerable amounts of land and had connections to urban investors, bankers, and politicians at 
the state and local level. Legends about manipulation of this bill were rampant. One story 
describes Henry Miller as sitting in a row boat atop a horse drawn wagon riding across a valley 
of grassland. By doing so, he was able to claim that he had covered a vast swath of land in a 
boat; therefore it could be labeled as swampland.
60
  Miller was not alone in his efforts to add 
acres of “swampland” to his already considerable holdings. What men like Miller, Lux, and 
William S. Chapman, a San Francisco real estate agent, realized early on was that certain areas in 
the San Joaquin Valley were covered by water during the wet season, which was a brief period, 
the rest of the year the land was dry and often ideal for planting.
61
 Most of these types of land 
purchases were made far in advance of homesteading rights, leaving even less public land 
available when the laws did go into effect.  
 In addition, when land was finally made available to homesteaders and for public 
purchase, land barons simply employed different tactics to procure even more acres for their 
estates. One strategy used to obtain tracts of land was to establish dummy purchasers and later, 
false homesteads. Individuals put in claims to purchase the maximum number of acres and then 
turned them over to employers or individuals who paid them a fee. This was true for many 
enterprises including the California Redwood Company, who would take immigrants right off 
the docks to the homestead office, have them get their documents in order, and then pay them a 
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50-dollar fee to sign over the paperwork.
62
 It was unlikely that very many knew what was 
happening except some very helpful men took them ashore and gave them a large sum of money 
for their troubles. Men who already owned thousands of acres were signed over thousands more 
through these homestead patents. In addition, bankers, speculators, and investors, used dummy 
companies and continued to acquire land through homestead claims. James Haggin, who made 
his vast fortune in multiple gold rushes that occurred in the West and eventually owned more 
than a million acres in California, used these methods to obtain 183,000 acres. Lloyd Tevis, a 
banker and associate of Haggin, and William B. Carr, Republican Party boss, and the so called 
“King of Kern County” received smaller land holdings in this same manner.63 It was difficult for 
real homesteaders to compete with men like this for what little land had been made available.  
Even land set aside for internal improvements and schools was not safe from efforts to 
acquire property. The Morrill Act of 1862 required that land be set aside to sell with the intent of 
the proceeds being used for the funding schools and agricultural colleges. School scrip was used 
by many of the same individuals that filed dummy claims for homesteading to purchase this land. 
Scrip, a substitute for legal tender that can only be used for specified purposes, allowed for the 
purchase of no less than 40 acres in sections set aside for providing funding for education within 
divisions of surveyed land. Property in this area was very valuable because of the location within 
surveyed divisions and the potential for commercial, if not agricultural, development. Of the 96 
individuals who used scrip to purchase school land, cattle magnates Miller and Lux received 
19,078 acres, and Gerald Nash had 91,000 acres signed over to him.
64
 These men used 
Agricultural College scrip to purchase even more acres from the University of California. Land 
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purchased with scrip through the Morrill Land Act had to be recorded in land patent books at 
increments of 160 acres. In one set of patent books the first forty-seven pages alone were filled 
with purchases made by William Chapman, Isaac Freelander, and Miller & Lux.
65
 In brief, such 
land purchases increased the sizeable holdings these men already controlled, expanding land 
monopolies throughout the Valley. 
Only six years after the Homestead Act was passed in 1862 to encourage the growth of 
small farms across the country, there were 4,753 farms in California which were, on average, 
more than 3,500 acres in size and that acreage continued to increase well into the 1870’s.66 As 
acres were planted to crops instead of being used primarily for cattle ranching, water scarcity 
became more of a concern for farmers. Those with large estates wanted to ensure they were able 
to control access to the valuable resource, determining who could and could not use water. Many 
of these same individuals purchased land along rivers or with claims to riparian rights making it 
difficult for farmers without direct access to river water or riparian rights of their own to make 
the fertile land bloom. For example, Miller & Lux purchased land and water rights along the 
Pajaro River, San Benito River, Pacheco Creek and Carnadero Creek, all land that was desirable 
to small farmers because of its proximity to water.
67
 Henry Miller acquired one such estate from 
Francisco Soberanesa, who had been granted the land in 1862 by the General Land Office 
honoring his 1851 Mexican land grant, shown in Figure 3.4. This land purchase, illustrated on 
the following page, was Miller’s favorite property. In the drawing, Miller’s land is show on both 
sides of the San Joaquin River and has housing, vineyards, and irrigation networks neatly 
planned out, making success on such a property highly likely, and this being only one of his 
properties. In contrast, small farmers seldom had the opportunity to make land purchases with 
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easy access to irrigation waters, often times making it difficult for them to compete with the vast 
holdings of men who had consolidated land as a consequence of their wealth and power.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Plan for the Santa-Rita Ranch 1877.  Milliken Museum Public Domain entry=153 
Favorite home of Henry Miller, located on a branch of the San Joaquin River. The neatly draw dwellings, 
garden, and vineyard are all nestled between irrigation canals, sloughs, and the San Joaquin River. This is 
but a glimpse of the land and water supplies that Miller controlled, and is telling of his expansive holdings 
across three states.  
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Figure 3.4 Grant Document.  Land grant document for Santa-Rita Ranch, signed by Abraham Lincoln. 
This document signified land ownership that was eventually transferred to Miller for the Santa-Rita 
Ranch. Numerous other land titles were signed over to Miller, Lux, Haggin, and many other estate holders 
in California.  
 
      Generally speaking, small farmers already found it difficult to compete in the marketplace as 
their overhead was greater than agribusinesses, they did not always have the luxury of hiring 
cheap seasonal labor, and adding the difficulty and cost of attaining water for irrigation all ate 
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into their profits, making the success of their farming efforts less likely than their affluent 
neighbors. Moreover, those who controlled riparian rights sometimes limited how much water 
other farmers received. Manipulation of water resources were seen by some as an opportunity to 
acquire land that had already been improved but whose owners were no longer able to afford to 
pay for irrigation water or found themselves unable to make a profit. Many small farmers in such 
a position were forced to put their  land up for sale or, worse still, had farms foreclosed on by the 
banks who seemed unwilling to extend credit to yeoman farmers. An unintended consequence of 
this process was the increase in urban populations as families who had migrated to California 
found good land too expensive, the cost of irrigation improvements too costly, or farming simply 
too difficult, frequently saw moving to cities and finding work as their only option. This has a 
level of irony as many small farmers looked toward urban centers as the source of their 
difficulties. After all, major cities housed bankers, land developers, and railroad magnates, all 
enemies of the common man in the Populist narrative. In any case, because so many families 
sold or were forced off their land, ownership became even more concentrated in the state.  
 As a result of legal maneuvering and manipulation of both financial and environmental 
resources, land monopoly was more widespread and lasted longer in California than any other 
state.
68
 This fact shaped California land holdings and agricultural development as corporate 
farms are common even when property is held under a family name, or multiple farmers lease 
from a land holding company which is still a corporate entity. Residents who were not privy to 
the logistics of farming may not have understood this, equating the term farmer with the yeoman 
tradition of yore. But, as water availability periodically became an issue for Californians, where 
the water went and what it was used for became hotly debated topics. Unfortunately, once water 
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supplies became ample concerns over who was using water subsided and land consolidation 
became little more than an afterthought for most, save some small farmers.  
However, there was public outcry over land monopoly occurring in real time including 
several newspaper editors that championed the cause of small farmers. Henry George, classical 
economist and editor of the San Francisco Daily Post, tried to make Californians aware of both 
the monopolistic practices and their long-term consequences to smaller farms, communities, and 
the state.  Other newspapers, including the Sacramento Bee and Sacramento Union, decried the 
monopolistic activities, too.
69
 It had become clear to many that public lands had not been 
distributed in accordance with the Homestead Act and that some individuals had circumvented 
the law in almost every way possible, allowing them to build agricultural empires. In light of this 
information, incidents of violence occurred when preemptors were evicted from their homes, and 
many Californians became convinced that political, economic, and social systems were not 
working in accordance with democratic ideals.   
Agrarian populism was on the rise in the United States in the 1870s, in reaction to what 
many saw as the struggle of the people against wealthy, powerful, and greedy industrialists. The 
National Farmers Alliance and The National Grange saw the growth of land and farming 
monopolies as undemocratic and the large number of such landholdings in California helped 
bolster their belief that money and power were used as tools to subjugate the common man.
70
 It 
was within the framework of this national discourse that the California State Grange held 
meetings to inform the public, petitioned state and federal officials, and attempted to get 
progressive members into state and federal positions in order to limit new land grabs and to 
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break up monopolies that already existed. The Grange and Farmers Alliance made every effort to 
assert the will of the people and produce a cooperative and local alternative to what they saw as 
increasingly centralizing tendencies of industrial capitalism.
71
 These efforts were strong, but the 
power of large landholders proved stronger as they appeared to be integral to the inevitability of 
economic progress.  
 Populists had not been wrong in their assessment of the importance of power and wealth 
in the process of centralization and industrialization of farming. Unfortunately, what members of 
the Grange feared regarding land grabs had already come to pass by the time their movement had 
momentum at the state or national level. For instance, by 1871, when 6,000,000 acres of land had 
been removed by either homestead or purchase, homestead entries made up just over 809,000 
acres.
72
  Land scrip made up about 1,618,000 acres and more than 3,300,000 were removed via 
purchase.
73
  A limit on the number of acres available for land purchase was established by the 
late 1870s, but it was already too late. Noted agricultural economist Paul S. Taylor described “a 
pattern of extraordinary concentration of landownership had already become established in 
California, especially in the southern and western San Joaquin Valley. It survives to this day.”74 
Taylor made this observation in 1947, at which time thirty-four individual and corporate owners 
each held 5,000 acres or more.  
By 2012, even though California was able to boast the greatest number of small farms 
when compared to other states, 65 percent of farmers had fewer than 50 acres in 2012 compared 
to a national average of 39 percent, the greatest number of acres and market shares were still held 
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by a few individuals or by corporations.
75
 Much of the farmland in the San Joaquin Valley was 
held by investment companies and corporate farms, sometimes leasing land out to individual 
farmers. This concentration of land was a holdover from the methods used in land acquisition 
during the early years of statehood. Much of the original land was obtained by developers, 
bankers, and oil companies. Still more acres were held in partnerships, by corporate farms, or  
other companies such as railroads, often with the heads of one company having ties to others, all 
of whom relied on water from the San Joaquin River to increase the value of their assets. As 
water was essential in keeping the land productive and values high, and due to the uncertainty of 
precipitation and river flow, water policy began to be written in favor of such individuals to 
ensure their success. Consequently, water began to be allocated according to size of land 
holdings instead of to the greatest number of small-scale, individual farmers as was originally 
intended.
76
  
Competing in the marketplace with those whose dominion stretched across thousands of 
acres of land was certainly a concern for small farmers, but there was also a negative impact on 
state revenue due to lax land and tax policy. Prior to the turn of the century, the greater the 
amount of land owned, the lower the percentage of taxes the owners paid, increasing the 
imbalance between those with resources and those without. Owners who had made 
improvements to their farmland tended to pay a tax rate eight to ten times higher than those who 
had not improved their lands, and improvements were most often made by small farmers, with 
the number of acres taxed in this category at approximately 5,000,000 acres. Roughly 21,000,000 
acres of unimproved land, taxed at a lower rate, were typically owned by cattle ranchers or 
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investors.
77
 This meant that 75 percent of the total taxes collected on agricultural real estate in 
California were paid by small farmers who had only 20 percent of land, the other 80 percent of 
was owned by wealthy individuals or corporations paying only 25 percent of the state’s 
agricultural taxes. By the twenty-first century, revenue that could have been generated by taxing 
this faction of land owners could be assessed in the billions. This money could have been used to 
improve roads and other forms of transportation, build schools, and fund social programs in 
California, what a difference this may have made for all residents in the state.      
The same individuals that could afford to buy millions of acres also had enough money 
and power to influence which laws regarding land were passed or enforced, often to the 
detriment of their neighbors. Not surprisingly, this same pattern of circumvention and blatant 
disregard was evident in the fight to remove the acreage limitation for access to federally funded 
water. Water was an essential component in maintaining the value of land for both agricultural 
use and residential/business development. Accordingly, in order to ensure prospects of future 
development, many land barons began to focus on water rights and private water storage and 
diversion projects. Initially, the cost for such projects limited their size and therefore their ability 
to redirect water to all acres held by landowners, which was later used to make the case for 
having government agencies take the lead in future water storage projects. In the meantime, 
irrigation networks remained relatively local and even some small farmers established irrigation 
communities to build and maintain small-scale canals and reservoirs.   
Although it took some time to become evident, the remarkable amount of land 
consolidated by a few individuals in California had a significant impact on the water crisis faced 
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by residents of the state. It is true that there were always periods of drought and then ample 
rainfall in the in the Central Valley as this was inherent of the climate in the region. However, 
the staggering number of acres eventually planted to crops in such an environment led to an 
increasingly greater need to control water resources in the area. Furthermore, new farmers found 
little land available for purchase or homestead with access to enough water for their farms to 
become prosperous. Just as land was consolidated, so to was access to the resource that would 
make that land flourish, seemingly without much thought to the long-term consequences of 
continued growth in agriculture or urban development. Thus, those who had control over land 
and the resources found on it were better suited to exert power over individuals and communities 
that relied upon those resources. This held true in the twenty-first century as landowners with 
deep pockets were able to access deep aquifers to ensure the success of their crops while those 
with more modest means struggled to make it through long periods of drought. In addition, those 
with power and influence were also increasingly keen on crafting water policy within the state, 
ensuring that they would have access to water for their crops during dry spells. Circular in 
nature, this process also allowed agribusinesses to purchase land from individuals who found it 
necessary to cut their losses and sell off some or all of their farmland when times became too 
difficult. Thus, it was understandable that after much of the land had been homesteaded, 
purchased, or misappropriated; those that owned the most turned their attention to the resource 
that made it valuable, water.  
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Chapter Four 
Canal Kings: Riparian Rights and the Promise of Fortune 
“The marketplace is an institution that teaches self-advancement, private acquisition, 
and the domination of nature. Its way of thinking is incompatible with the round river. 
Ecological harmony is a nonmarket value that takes a collective will to achieve.”             
        -Donald Worster 
"When the well is dry, we learn the worth of water"  
 -Benjamin Franklin 
 
In 1873, California suffered a drought that hit the southern half of the state the hardest.  
Many farmers could not afford to replant, cattle and sheep men drove their herds into nearby 
states for grazing, and many abandoned their homesteads altogether.
78
 This sparked interest in 
reclamation projects, specifically private investment in water relocation and development. 
Although there had been previous efforts to build canals and redirect water in the 1850’s and 
1860’s, the first large-scale endeavor was undertaken by John Bensley, a businessman from San 
Francisco.
79
 Due to the drought and because construction of the railroad through the Valley was 
underway, speculators were very interested in Bensley’s ideas for construction of canals in the 
San Joaquin Valley.
80
 Initially his enterprise faced periods of near economic ruin, but Bensley 
was eventually able to get enough investors, including financial support from William C. 
Ralston, president of The Bank of California, to organize the San Joaquin and Kings River Canal 
Company (SKRCC).
81
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Like many proponents of land development in California, the list of investors for 
Bensley’s company read like a who’s who of California powerbrokers. The list included 
prominent financial experts such as Nicholas Luning and A.J. Pope, directors of the Bank of 
California, and Lloyd Tevis, President of the Wells Fargo Company. Several landowners were 
also listed; especially those with large tracts of land in the southern half of the San Joaquin 
Valley. There were men like Isaac Friedlander, who controlled a wheat monopoly in California, 
and Henry Miller and Charles Lux, who owned so much land in the southern half of the San 
Joaquin Valley that no usable canal could be constructed without passing through some part of 
it.
82
 Men with such vast land holdings stood to make huge profits from water storage and 
redirection, either by using water on their own land or by selling access to small farmers and 
farming communities. More importantly for Miller & Lux the first portion of the canal would go 
through their property, diverting water onto drought stricken grazing land.
83
 This project would 
give them a leg up on their competitors in two ways, watering their grazing land to ensure their 
cattle were fattened for market during years of drought and give them control over whom else 
had access to water during these dry periods. Canal projects appeared to be a win-win situation 
for those fortunate enough to invest.  
Bensley and the SKRCC board found it much easier to deal with agribusinesses and 
large-scale landowners than small farmers. Issues of riparian rights and the cost of leasing land 
for construction and maintenance of canals were easier to negotiate when dealing with fewer 
people, so proprietors of large estates were sought out over large groups of small farmers. In the 
case of the SKRCC, Miller and Lux had also promised to purchase water for irrigation once 
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canals and aqueducts had been completed in exchange for stock in the company.
84
 Of course, 
guaranteed revenue from large-scale landowners was more appealing to investors than the 
possibility of revenues from small farmers so this arrangement worked well for all parties. This, 
according to Gates, was the beginning of the monopolization of water resources by those who 
controlled access to those sources. Land ownership had provided the means for the development 
of mining, railroad construction, and agricultural industries to expand in California, now land 
ownership eased these same western industries into a position of control over water resources. 
However, once aqueducts and canals were constructed by private enterprises, farmers downriver 
or without appropriate funds could find themselves without water and less able to compete in the 
marketplace or make payments to banks during years of poor harvests. Those who controlled the 
water, therefore, could also effectively manipulate farmers into selling their land and increasing 
their own holdings, consolidating land in the Central Valley even further. 
The question of who would benefit from water relocation provided by the SKRCC was a 
concern for some board members and engineers of the project. It was evident that, because most 
of the construction would be on large tracts of land owned by one person or company, large-
scale landowners would profit the most. Land adjacent to the canals and farms and grazing land 
which had already been improved would also become more valuable and thus more expensive 
making it even more difficult for small farmers to afford. It is interesting to note that issues of 
land and water use were present at the earliest discussions in establishing water reclamation and 
distribution systems, even when owned by private enterprises. Clearly those who invested in or 
worked on the project realized there would be long-term consequences for homesteaders and 
rural communities alike. To be sure, there were some investors that hoped to spark immigration 
into the Central Valley to ensure the growth of towns and farms. However, unlike factory owners 
                                                          
84
 Ibid.  
 
 
54 
  
that found paying urban workers a living wage afforded them the choice of buying goods made 
in the factory, agricultural products were often shipped to distant markets or at least major cities 
with populations that require a constant food supply. Consequently, as long as the agricultural 
goods made it to market, it made little difference who was growing the crops or getting them 
there. Several investors, specifically Miller & Lux, understood this and so construction of the 
canal continued without much more debate. 
Eventually construction costs for the small scale irrigation projects proved more 
expensive than anticipated. More investors were sought out, but with little success. Robert 
Maitland Brereton, chief engineer for the SKRCC, began to lobby Congress for a federal land 
grant in the San Joaquin Valley. Once again, ties to those with power and wealth made it easier 
to accomplish the goals of the SKRCC.  Connections between William C. Ralston and Nevada 
Senator William Morris Stewart proved invaluable, and by February of 1873, the bill proposed 
by the SKRCC had passed both the House and the Senate. Passage of the bill gave right of way 
to the SKRCC through Kern, Tulare, Fresno, Modesto, Stanislaus, San Joaquin, Contra Costa, 
and Alameda counties. In addition, the company pursued a grant of 256,000 acres of land to 
cover construction costs and “a promise of virtual monopoly over the waters of Buena Vista and 
Tulare lakes and of the Kern and San Joaquin rivers.”85 That is to say, the canals and reservoirs 
would be built and control of both land and water resources would stay in the hands of those with 
immense wealth with the obvious potential of appropriating even more. 
In reaction to what was seen by the people of California as yet another example of wealth 
and power used to suppress the masses, local Grange associations protested the construction and 
funding for private water projects putting their complaints into print in both the Sacramento 
Daily Bee and the Sacramento Union. Members of the Grange saw water monopolies and land 
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subsidies to fund construction of canals as antithetical to democracy and akin to serfdom.
86
 To 
appease angry citizens, Senator Stewart recommended that a federal government survey of 
irrigation for the Central Valley be conducted by a commission before any further work was 
completed. The survey of was approved by President Grant and the Board of Commissioners was 
established headed by General B.S. Alexander of the Army Corps of Engineers. Brereton was 
also offered a position, which he refused and instead served as an outside consultant.
87
  
Once completed, the Alexander Commission filed a report of their survey to present to 
President Grant in which it was determined that a long-term and large-scale water reclamation 
project would serve the interest of the citizens of California and the rest of the nation.  At this 
point, it appeared that funding the construction of the project was the only major obstacle. In 
particular, and just as the SKRCC had surmised, construction would be expensive, but it was 
theorized that the eventual increased value of land and tax revenues would likely cover the costs. 
However, getting the State and the citizens to support such an expensive project was 
problematic; farmers would not be able to afford the costs, and private companies found the 
investment risky without guarantees from state and federal agencies. A compromise was 
proposed in which the state and federal governments would help with construction costs via land 
grants and tax revenue, but construction would be completed by private companies who would 
build according to strict guidelines set forth by state officials.
88
 Public funding would be used to 
build the project, and sale of public lands would be used to recoup the costs.  
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Of course, water projects designed to reclaim desert lands and irrigate farms that were 
already squeezing out homesteaders was not convincing enough of an argument for the public to 
acquiesce to foot the bill for construction.
89
  Therefore, in an effort to appeal to average citizens, 
Congress concentrated more on what impact that water would have on the land owned by small 
farmers and focused their arguments on historic land policy in the United States, which allowed 
the state to decide who would get water and how much, determined by acreage and crop type. 
Given that many who invested in the SKRCC were also heavily connected to state and local 
politicians, even getting men elected to posts like county tax assessors to avoid paying real taxes, 
it was unlikely that they disagreed with this stipulation as they understood that they would have 
friends in the right places ensuring they would have access to water no matter the state 
requirement. As a result, there seemed to be more reasons to begin the reclamation project than 
to prolong construction. 
Another important factor in gaining support for the project was that the Alexander 
Commission also recommended that land and water rights be sold in conjunction so that 
monopolies would not be created by companies building the canals.
90
 This was necessary, 
according to Pisani, because the public was wary of monopolies of any sort at this time; the 
Populist movement was gaining strength amongst both urban workers and agrarian communities, 
both of which made up much of the population in California. The California State Grange was 
openly concerned about further consolidation of land and these concerns had to be addressed in 
order for the project to move forward with public support. Unfortunately, this cautious approach 
did not prevent a great deal of water from making its way onto the fields of agribusinesses as 
these industries had years of practice getting around laws that did not suit them. One result of 
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recommendations made by the committee, however, was the rejection of the proposed land 
grants which would have been given to the San Joaquin and Kings River Canal Company.
91
 
Nonetheless, this recommendation did not stop the consolidation of land nor did it limit in any 
real way control of access to water by men like Miller, Lux, Haggin, or Freelander.  
The goals of Ralston and Bensley, to reclaim the Central Valley through private 
enterprise, were never achieved. Faced with the results of the Alexander Commission’s 
recommendations and confronted by attacks from Californians over poor construction on parts of 
canals they had already built, the SKRCC was not able to continue to attract enough investment 
to complete construction according to their original design. In addition, the U.S. was in the midst 
of a deep economic recession and a populist, anti-monopoly sentiment had swept the nation, 
particularly against railroad companies due to increased shipping fees and anger over the amount 
of land granted to railroad companies which served to reimburse companies for construction 
costs. The same arguments began to be applied to water and land highlighting resentment over 
consolidation, especially in California, to the detriment of the Company. The common man had 
spoken and he wanted government intervention to provide some balance of power between the 
wealthy industrialist and the working class. 
The voice of the populism was strong in California during this period as members of the  
State Grange also railed against fees that would be imposed by the SKRCC whether members 
used irrigation water from the company or not.
92
 The Grange petitioned Congress to ensure that 
no land and water grants would be made in the future to private enterprises as they saw such 
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grants as collusion between Eastern and urban elites and government officials at the expense of 
small farmers. Failure of the San Joaquin and Kings River Construction Company did not mean 
an end to reclamation nor to the power struggle between private enterprise and access to public 
water. In fact, Miller & Lux became the beneficiaries of what was built of the canal on their 
property and related holdings for improved irrigation despite changes to water policy in 
California.
93
 What it did mean was that future water projects and water rights would be 
determined through state or federal entities still influenced by wealthy individuals in positions of 
power.   
A similar scenario played out with the Kern County Land and Water Company 
(KCLWC).  Some of the same men who had seen potential in the SKRCC, including Lloyd 
Tevis, invested in the KCLWC.  Tevis, James Ben-Ali Haggin, and William Carr had purchased 
tens of thousands of acres of the most readily irrigable land in the Central Valley.
94
  In 
anticipation of the settlers that would purchase available public land in Kern County, the driest 
part of the Valley, Tevis and his fellow investors attempted to buy up new and existing water 
rights throughout the county. The men also oversaw the construction of several ditches, making 
sure that they had majority control over several canals branching off from the Kern River. Farm 
settlements which could be irrigated by these canals were marketed as irrigation communities, 
and farmers who purchased this land paid for the privilege of water use. Thus, Tevis, Haggin and 
Carr were guaranteed a tidy return on their investment. In light of this, by 1875, Tevis, Haggin, 
and Carr also made claims of prior appropriation on the waters of the Kern River itself, which 
amounted to more water than the Kern ever actually carried.
95
 It was at this point that they 
                                                          
93
  David P. Billington, p. 310. 
94
 Taylor, p. 197, Pisani “Land Monopoly,” p. 27-29. 
95
 Pisani, “Land Monopoly”, p. 28. From Family Farm to Agribusiness, p. 197. 
 
 
59 
  
formed the KCLWC and began building more ditches and canals to divert water from the Kern 
River.  
  
 
Figure 4.1 Rosedale Colony. This map of surveyed and parceled land is a part of a land and irrigation 
development by the Kern County Land and Water Company owned and operated by Lloyd Tevis, James 
Haggin, and William Carr.
96
 The Rosedale Colony was a small farming community that paid for the 
privilege of utilizing small-scale canals and reservoirs on the land they purchased from the Kern County 
Land and Water Company.  The residents often maintained the facilities at their own expense, and 
eventually found that it was too costly to continue to farm as two years of drought made it impossible for 
them to pay their bills, let alone make a profit.  
 
Once again, the Grange stood up for small farmers in California with some success.  
Members of the Bakersfield Grange argued that the KCLWC forced farmers to purchase water 
from them and that the KCLWC cut off the water supplies to some farms and challenged the 
water rights of others in order to secure total control of water sources and drive out 
competitors.
97
 This, the Grange contested, amounted to ruin for small farmers in such a dry local 
as Kern County, especially near Bakersfield. The Grange could point to the Rosedale Colony, 
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illustrated on the previous page, as a prime example. Farmers in this community found that water 
supplies from the canals were not sufficient to irrigate crops over the course of a two year 
drought, and most had been forced to sell their land. Of course, it was the KCLWC that 
purchased the land from Rosedale farmers, recouping the money they had invested in irrigation 
and getting improved farmland to boot. Not surprisingly, investors in the KCLWC were well 
connected and well off and used these facts to manipulate and pressure local officials to bend to 
their will for several more years. In reality, it was not until the drought of 1877 and with the 
increased number of court cases filed against them that the Kern County Land and Water 
Company began to follow, at least for appearance sake, what few laws there were regarding 
water rights in California.
98
   
At this point it was quite clear that water control had led to a shift in the way farming 
communities functioned in California. Such communities had once controlled and maintained the 
water they needed for food production and individual consumption, which helped to limit social 
stratification within such communities. However, once land and water resources were 
consolidated to any real degree, well-organized growers with capital and influence were able to 
manipulate water supplies and the laws that governed water, land, and taxes, seldom paying their 
fair share.  In fact, environmental historian Donald Worster claimed that individuals with power, 
connections, and means seldom wanted to pay for improvements to water systems that they 
ultimately benefit from, and usually succeeded in having others foot a large part of the bill for 
such undertakings.
99
 This is one of the main arguments put forth by Worster in Rivers of Empire 
and is supported by both Gates and Pisani in their evaluation of land and water development and 
power structure in California. Relevance of this argument did not lessened over time; in fact it 
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became even more vital to issues surrounding water usage as agribusinesses complained loudly 
when not given their “fair share” of water during prolonged periods of drought.  
Giving credence to Worster’s argument, land barons paid others to do both construction 
and farming work, establishing a social stratification consisting of those who controlled the water 
and means of production and those who worked for wages. Worster went further, specifically 
making the claim that once the Bureau of Reclamation became involved and “corporations and 
quasi-corporate entities succeeded at last in farming rivers for substantial profits” it helped to 
create a “sharply divided rural class structure.”100 Although it is possible that stratification may 
have occurred with or without the Bureau of Reclamation getting involved, this social hierarchy 
was still apparent in farming communities in which agribusinesses were the dominant farming 
type long after water projects were completed and put into use. In communities with a strong 
economic link to agribusiness productivity, there also tended to be a feeling of the old “company 
towns” that could be found near mining industries or railroad construction, some towns even 
sport the names of old families such as McFarland and Spreckles. In communities reliant upon 
corporate farming, wage workers were dependent upon jobs provided by the agribusiness, small 
businesses relied on monies earned from wage workers, and both were tied to yield and market 
value of crops produced by the farm industry. As McWilliams put it “The farm population is 
oriented toward the market and both farm and small town reflect the ‘hierarchy of elites’ to be 
found in urban centers.”101 Agribusinesses and small-scale farmers alike understood that without 
water for farming or residential consumption, none of this, good or bad, would be possible.  
At the time concerns over who controlled water supplies were seen as temporary, it was 
believed by many Californians that the availability of water, or lack thereof, and the amount of 
                                                          
 
100
 Ibid p. 64. 
101
 Carey McWilliams, p. 102. 
 
 
62 
  
property tax owed by those with thousands of acres would eventually lead to the end of water 
and land monopolies in their state. Unfortunately, that proved to be untrue. Prior to construction 
of government funded water systems, many farmers relied on underground water supplies for 
irrigation and personal use.  As populations grew in hamlets and urban centers and the number of 
acres under cultivation expanded, so too did dependency on subterranean water supplies. The 
increased drain on aquifers led to a drop in the water table making extraction difficult for some. 
In light of these circumstances, it should have been evident to anyone using this method that 
there would be even more problems with extraction as farming expanded and urban areas spread 
across the state.  
There were immediate consequences felt by some part of the population as water levels 
dropped and farmers faced the costly task of drilling deeper wells. In many cases, small farmers 
abandoned their land altogether or sold it to more affluent neighbors.  For example, in 1930, 
Jimmie Palmer, an orange grower in Tulare County, was able to afford $1000, an enormous sum 
of money at the time, for a 507 foot well when his neighbors could not. He was then able to 
purchase more land as his neighbors’ faced both drought and the Depression and could no longer 
pay their debts.
102
  Joseph DiGiorgio, an Italian immigrant and successful East Coast grower and 
merchant who came West in 1915, was also able to buy up large tracts of his neighbors land as 
their farms began to fail due to drought.
103
  DiGiorgio was able to purchase thousands of 
adjoining acres of land, drill deeper wells to access lower water levels, and out produce his 
neighbors leading to more failing farms and more land purchased by him. DiGiorgio was a 
perfect example to illustrate the fact that more land and higher taxes coupled with limited water 
supplies did not mean large farms would be broken up. In fact, the larger the farm the greater the 
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advantage growers appeared to have had. And yet, this idea that large-scale farms in California 
could not continue to thrive persisted well into the twenty-first century and was debated ad 
nauseam despite most evidence indicating that it was not only possible that they would become 
the norm, but inescapable.  
 
Figure 4.2 Di Giorgio. Although this article from the San Francisco Call is from 1911, it illustrates the 
wealth and power that Di Giorgio already had prior to acquiring thousands more acres during the 
Depression. It also indicates the level of influence he held within agricultural communities.
104
 DiGiorgio 
was one of the few immigrants who were lucky and shrewd enough to come to the U.S, make a tidy profit 
in the East and then move west with the ambition of increasing their newly acquired wealth.  
 
In light of the advantage held by land barons, many land speculators and farmers 
purchased as much available land in the San Joaquin Valley as they were able to. They 
understood that there were aqueducts that ran throughout the Central Valley which could be 
accessed and utilized without regulation. However, it soon became clear that the water was not 
without limits, and the need for deeper and deeper wells proved too costly for some to entertain. 
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Even men like DiGiorgio realized that digging ever deeper wells was not a long-term solution to 
alleviate periodic water shortages. It was suggested that if an aboveground water redistribution 
systems were not put in place, many farmers would go under, causing banks to lose money, and 
lead to a negative economic impact statewide, even reaching external markets that sold crops 
grown in the San Joaquin Valley.
105
 In the midst of the Great Depression, this did not seem like a 
good option to many leaders at either the state or national level looking for ways to stabilize the 
economy.   
In agricultural communities, stabilizing the economy meant price supports, crop 
reduction subsidies, and storage for surplus agricultural products. It also meant providing access 
to low cost sources of water for those struggling to irrigate their fields. Addressing the irrigation 
needs of California fell under the purview of the Bureau of Reclamation, which established 
policy that would aid the citizens of the state by using federal funds to help construct water 
conduits from rivers and other aboveground sources. In theory this would help farmers and rural 
residents throughout the state and provide water for increased urban development. Reclamation 
was also intended to help with hydroelectric power and improve the economies of agricultural 
regions in the Central Valley, which would, in turn, allow farmers to hire workers, pay bank 
loans, increase monetary circulation, and create revenues to offset the cost of construction. Under 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as part of the New Deal, farmers were also paid to keep a 
percentage of their land unplanted to encourage the stabilization of farm prices and allow 
recovery of the land itself. However, the Central Valley Project was not simply saving the 
estimated 200,000 acres already planted and in need of water but would irrigate an additional 
3,000,000 acres already in the hands of private investors.
106
 This meant that while farmers in 
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almost every other state were required to limit how much they grew, farmers in California were 
allowed to bring more land under cultivation, specifically corporate farms. Eventually, those who 
paid close attention to the power struggle between the Bureau of Reclamation and large growers 
saw that the CVP was not going to focus on aiding small farmers but rather to save “big, multi-
billion-dollar private agricultural investment.”107 Little changed over the next several decades, 
except that some small farmers joined cooperatives or established partnerships with corporate 
farms in order to have a similar advantage. Unfortunately, this only served to exacerbate the 
problem of water shortage and aquifer collapse.  
Tackling water shortage in the arid but fertile areas of California was a large part of what 
the Bureau of Reclamation aimed to do.  However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
 
centuries, large landowners were, for the most part, opposed to state or federal water programs. 
There were several reasons for this opposition. First, most of these landowners controlled land 
near, or had rights to, above-ground water sources. Second, there was no regulation on 
groundwater pumping, and there was plenty of groundwater in aquifers throughout the San 
Joaquin Valley and on their property; thus, they did not feel the need for water diversion on a 
large-scale. Third, water storage and relocation would allow for increased access for smaller 
farmers and reduce the dominance of large farmers and land owners in the area. Fourth, water 
was seen as a commercial instrument that could be used to alter markets for land, agriculture, and 
urban development. It was not until a drought occurred in the 1920’s that large landowners began 
to be concerned with large-scale water storage and relocation projects. Farmers, especially those 
with large estates, were forced to rely more heavily on groundwater during this period. Aquifers 
were not able to replenish naturally because of the drought causing groundwater levels in the San 
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Joaquin Valley to fall roughly 39 feet by 1939.
108
 New Deal programs targeted at the agricultural 
sector seemed to provide a way out of this cycle of overdraft. The possibility of increased water 
availability prompted growers throughout the Central Valley, regardless of the size of their land 
holdings, to begin seeking state and federal aid in the development of water resource 
management systems.  
In order to develop reservoirs and canals that would help with urban development and 
provide relief for California farmers, the Bureau of Reclamation needed to establish a set of 
water management guidelines. Part of policy they established included supplying water from 
publicly funded water works only to farms of a particular size. Limiting how much land can and 
should be cultivated by individual farmers was not a new idea, and was a foundational part of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act which did help stabilize farm prices. In fact, part of the logic when 
drawing up the plans for the Central Valley Project and presenting it to Congress revolved 
around the possibility of supplying water to a large number of farmers in California but not to 
farms that were large in size. The Bureau of Reclamation, under whose authority the CVP was 
constructed, settled upon the 160-acre limit to determine who would have access to water from 
the project.  The goal of this limitation was for family-owned homesteads of 160 acres, 320 if 
owners were married, to have access to inexpensive and dependable water so that they could be 
productive and competitive. Moreover, the ideal of an agrarian democracy was not lost on 
Americans living during the Depression, and 160 acres seemed a reasonable amount to most.   
Irrigation was not the only component of Reclamation policy. Indeed, flood control, 
energy production, water storage and distribution were all elements of the public works project 
designed to bring dependable, low-cost water to the greatest number of people all over 
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California.
109
 These topics were open for discussion and concerns regarding all of them were 
addressed to varying degrees of satisfaction. Of course discussions about these issues continued, 
and all the components of public water programs were debated prior to, during, and after the 
CVP was funded, built, and put in to use.  For the most part, these same issues continued to 
plague the state in light of environmental impact studies conducted as early as the 1960s, which 
led to increased energy costs and, most obviously, drought. 
In spite of disagreements over certain aspects of Reclamation policy, the acreage 
limitation was adopted prior to construction. The acreage limitation written into the CVP’s 
charter was based on homestead language used by the federal government.  Part of the reason it 
was adopted was due to the fact that many congressmen and farmers alike were concerned that 
private landholders, those with thousands of acres, stood make a hefty profit from a publicly 
funded water program. For example, land without water in Kern or Tulare counties was not 
worth very much, but once the Central Valley Project was commissioned, this land became 
extremely valuable. Speculators had already bought up huge tracts of land and sold it to farmers 
for a hefty profit, this was sure to become an even greater problem if there was an assurance of 
future irrigation projects in the Central Valley.  For instance, according to a report submitted to 
the Secretary of the Interior by the Committee of Special Advisers on Reclamation during the 
68
th
 Congress, “…the settler, full of hope, frequently agreed to pay a high price for the land, in 
addition to the construction cost included in his water-right contract.”110 Farming was very labor 
intensive and subject to the whims of both the market and nature, making it difficult for smaller 
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farms to become profitable in the early years, especially when trying to pay off the costs of 
water-right contracts.  
In an effort to remedy the issue of land speculation and increased costs passed along to 
farmers for improved irrigation systems, Congress added a provision in the Omnibus Adjustment 
Act of 1926, prior to acceptance of the proposed CVP.  Specifically established to limit 
speculation, the Act required that land in areas zoned to receive water could not be sold until half 
of the construction charges were repaid.
111
 It was the hope of those who supported it that this 
would help lift the burden of water-rights costs from small farmers and encourage more family 
farms in the Central Valley. On the surface, this seemed to have been effective as by 2014 the 
average farm size in California was 312 acres and many were fewer than 50, as illustrated in 
Table 1. However, such averages can be misleading as some farms were tens of thousands of 
acres, accounting for the bulk of land under cultivation. Figure 4.3 shows that, even though they 
made up only a fraction of the farms in 2007 and 2012, larger farms still held ninety percent of 
the agricultural market. These larger farms also continued to receive federally subsidized water.  
Table 1 Average Farm Size in California.  California had a higher percentage of small farms than the 
national average, but this figure does not show exactly how large some farms in the state were. Size does 
matter in this case. In fact, if it was reported that only two farms were over 2,000 acres, this information 
would not really say anything as those farms could be one million acres apiece. Capping the acreage at 
2,000 is misleading and other measures need to be presented to get have an accurate assessment. ARE 
Update 17(5) (2014):5-8. University of California Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics.  
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Figure 4.3 Market Shares in Agriculture. This pie chart shows that, even though they made up only 
about eight percent of the farms in California, larger (often corporate farms) had over 90 percent of the 
market shares in agriculture for the state. They had more market shares, made higher profits, and did so 
with water subsidized with taxpayer money. ARE Update 17(5) (2014):5-8. University of California 
Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics. 
 
Although it had accepted as part of the requirements to get funding for the Central Valley 
Project, controversy over the 160-acre limitation began even before construction was underway. 
Even though large landowners now encouraged dam construction, water diversion, and flood 
control, they were unified in opposition to the limitation. Notably, by the 1940s, arguments over 
the limitation were heating up as it became clear just how much land could be cultivated by 
using federally funded water programs. Almost no argument against the limitation went untried. 
In fact, one of the most convoluted arguments against the acreage limitation was put forth by 
Senator Sheridan Downey. He claimed that large landholders like the Kern County Land 
Company, (KCLC), with 350,000 acres in Kern County alone, did not need or want the water 
from the CVP.
112
  In addition, Downey asserted that the KCLC was perfectly happy using water 
they were pumping from wells and that purchasing water from public works would be cost 
prohibitive. This was true for most corporate farms in the Valley, he concluded, making the land 
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limitation arbitrary and unnecessary.
113
 The most practical thing, he argued, would be to get rid 
of the limitation altogether so that moderately sized farms in excess of the acreage limitation 
would be allowed access to CVP water. Of course, this appealed to families with acreage 
exceeding the limit as it would allow them to compete with agribusinesses, at least in theory.  
What was not lost on smaller farmers at the time was that once the limitation was gone even 
corporate farms would openly have access to CVP or SWP water, making the perceived benefit 
to moderately sized farms short-lived.  
Likewise, many supporters of the limitation agreed that the number used to denote who 
had access to public water was arbitrary and that perhaps the amount of land one could own and 
still get the resource should be increased. Experts conceded that they did not have a plan to deal 
with the amount of water that could or should be pumped from underground sources in 
California, an issue that continued to present a challenge for the state by 2011. However, most 
acknowledged that keeping the limitation where it stood until a new number could be agreed 
upon was better than no limitation at all. Much like earlier politicians that had helped Miller, 
Lux, Haggin, and others circumvent limits on land purchase, Downey could not, or would not, 
see the logic in this answer. He accused those in favor of keeping the limit as “doing nothing” 
instead of making a decision.
114
  Downy also berated the education and professional experience 
of many Bureau of Reclamation officials in his book, They Would Rule the Valley, a tactic not 
lost on modern politicians or pundits.
115
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Figure 4.4 Senator Downey. Senator Sheridan Downey in his office, 1940. Although a liberal in his 
early political career, Downey secured support from California agribusiness and the oil industry once in 
office as a senator, to the delight of big business across the state.  
In light of all these issues, it seemed a dilemma for politicians and the public alike to 
assess what problems arose and what problems were solved by having an acreage limit in order 
to access publicly funded water supplies. Although it was understood that the idea of a limit was 
meant to be a way to help the many instead of the few, it was also true that much of the land in 
the San Joaquin Valley had been owned by private investors for a very long time. In 1947, there 
were an estimated 9,500 farms that exceeded the acreage limit. This meant that there were only 
two-million acres of farmland that met a newly established limit of 180 acres, and almost eleven 
million acres that exceeded the maximum.
116
 Not all large farms were owned or operated by 
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corporations; some were simply large family-owned spreads, which seemed to further complicate 
the issue. For some, like Senator Downey and Edward Hyatt, California’s State Engineer, the 
answer was simple; water should be distributed according to the amount of property held, not 
limited by it.
117
 The simple logic of this argument follows a capitalistic and Social Darwinist 
philosophy. Simply put, farms that are the most fit or can respond to the “free market” are more 
likely to succeed. Those that do not will fail. On its face this seems reasonable, even appealing. 
However, anyone familiar with John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice will see that the playing field 
was not level in this instance.
118
  Those who began with more money and land had an 
exponentially greater chance to become more successful and squeeze out their smaller, less 
powerful competitors.  The role of government should, therefore, not be to facilitate the growth 
of large businesses and the expense of smaller businesses, but rather to ensure access to 
resources to facilitate possible growth at all levels. The former is in direct opposition with the 
principles of democracy and equality. Although many did not see the wisdom of imposing 
limitations, enough did to ensure that limits would stay in place, at least for a while.  
Unfortunately for Downey and Hyatt, many in the Bureau of Reclamation, Congress, and 
experts in agriculture and economics, like Paul S. Taylor, agreed that the spirit of the reclamation 
law was to use public funds to provide the greatest good for the greatest number of people. 
Taylor, a humanist as well as an economist, saw several issues with allowing those with large 
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amounts of land access to water from publicly funded projects.
119
 Many of the issues Taylor was 
concerned with were social, but they revolved around the consequences of creating agricultural 
monopolies. He, and many others, felt that access to low-cost water would further skew the 
advantage of large farms, making it even more difficult for smaller, family-run farms to compete 
and remain viable. If smaller farms were not able to compete with agribusinesses and land 
developers, they would be more likely to sell their land. Thus, large farms would be able to 
purchase land already under development by these small farmers and increase their hold on 
agricultural monopolies. In Taylor’s estimation, this was neither democratic nor a good use of 
public funds, and he was not alone in his thinking. Many Americans had learned a great deal 
about resource depletion and monopolies during the Gilded Age, the Progressive Era, and the 
Great Depression. Like Taylor, such individuals did not see agricultural industry any differently 
than manufacturing, mining, or transportation monopolies, but convincing still more individuals 
that they were similar proved difficult. 
In an effort to silence critics of the acreage limitation, the Bureau of Reclamation hoped 
to show what impact corporate farming had on agricultural communities in California versus the 
impact of family-owned farms.
120
 The Bureau had a theory that family-sized farms produced 
communities in which residents had a better quality of life than did large corporate farms. To test 
this theory, a study was conducted in 1944 by Walter R. Goldschmidt, an anthropologist and 
graduate student at the University of California. Goldschmidt concluded that communities whose 
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economies revolved around family farms had a better quality of life than did those communities 
whose economies revolved around industrialized farming.
121
 Two towns in the San Joaquin 
Valley served as test subjects for the study: Arvin in Kern County, which had mainly large 
farms, and Dinuba in Tulare County, which had smaller, family-sized farms. Goldschmidt used 
questions designed to measure income, job opportunity, education, and allocation of local funds. 
On average, wages were found to be higher in Dinuba, people had more say in what happened 
within their community and, as a consequence, more funds were used for the good of the town.  
Streets were paved, Dinuba had sidewalks, there were modest single-family homes, more 
professionals lived in town, and more businesses were present even though the farms themselves 
made less money annually than did those in Arvin.  In contrast, Arvin farms made $14,700 more 
than did Dinuba farmers each year, but the town had few paved streets and fewer professionals 
and businesses, the bulk of the population being labor wage earners.
122
  
Findings in Goldschmidt’s report supported convictions held by Taylor and several 
members of the Bureau of Reclamation, but were subsequently discredited by state water 
officials and politicians opposed to limitation, who claimed the study was propaganda.  This was 
unfortunate because, as McWilliams pointed out in 1949, the residents of California were still 
trying to deal with social instability rooted in the relationship between people and the land.
123
 
Social issues persisted in the state that can be tied directly to social and economic structures that 
existed in farming towns in which seasonal and or immigrant labor was utilized on a regular 
basis. In many such communities, an underclass of immigrant workers, sometimes 
undocumented, found themselves marginalized and taken advantage of by growers, often with no 
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means of improving their situation. Just as with other industries, this system often served the 
owners in two ways. First, lower wages were paid to immigrant or minority laborers, which 
allowed for more profits to go into the pocket of farmers and or investors. Second, growers were 
able to deflect the cause of low wages as a consequence of immigrants coming into the United 
States; it was simply not the farmers’ fault wages were low. Indeed, this tactic was not new to 
industrialists and was utilized in both the economic and political arena to keep laborers pitted 
against one another making organization all but impossible. Unfortunately, the impact of such 
tactics was experienced by laborers as evidenced by their economic conditions and social 
interactions. For instance, the Economist ran an article as late as 2010 compared living 
conditions in the Central Valley with that of Appalachia. Although not a flattering comparison, it 
underscored the fact that social and economic structures established in California farming 
communities did not improve much in the years after construction of the CVP began and, in 
some cases, were even worse.   
Although most opposition to the Central Valley Project did revolve around the 160-acre 
limitation, there were other areas of contention. State officials, including the California Division 
of Water Resources, the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), the state Chamber of 
Commerce, and agribusinesses, predominantly from the San Joaquin Valley, all worked to end 
the acreage limitation.
124
 State officials felt the federal government had too much control over 
state water resources. This was, in part, why the State Water Project was proposed and 
constructed. The SWP distributed and enforced repayment differently than the CVP and gave 
more leverage to state officials who had historically opposed limiting water based on acreage.  
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Some critics also claimed that, although the CVP was presented primarily as an irrigation 
project, its real goal was to create a federally run power system. The Assistant Director of the  
Public Utilities Department of the California Farm Bureau, Edson Abel, went so far as to say the 
irrigation project was just a means of getting public support for taking over private businesses, 
namely power.
125
  PG&E began to support the CVP when it became clear that no funding for the 
construction of electrical lines for power delivery would be forthcoming.  As PG&E already had 
electrical lines built, they were the natural choice for delivery of power from the hydroelectric 
stations located at dams along the CVP to businesses and private homes throughout the valley.
126
   
Energy delivery and sales continued to be an issue in the state, but PG&E was no longer pushing 
for the Bureau to relinquish control of the CVP, at least for the present. There may have been one 
less group opposing the CVP, but this deal did nothing for their image as the public viewed them 
as increasingly in cahoots with big business, and the battle over limitations no longer unified 
supporters.   
As the struggle over acreage limit continued weakly, the Bureau of Reclamation began to 
lose influence.  Former supporters saw the shift in energy to PG&E as selling out to big business. 
A report on the study by Goldschmidt was never officially published by the Bureau of 
Agriculture, (BEA) and was therefore not used to support claims made by the Bureau of 
Reclamation that family-farms were better for local economies and community development. In 
fact, the BEA tried to suppress the work as men like Senator Downey and Congressman Alfred J 
Elliot lambasted the piece as propaganda intended to limit the opportunity of all farmers in 
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California.
127
 The Bureau found its authority over the CVP being challenged from the common 
man because of their relationship with PG&E in addition to challenges from industrial farmers 
from the south and state policy makers regarding the acreage limitation. By the second half of 
the twentieth century the Bureau of Reclamation was operating almost in survival mode, 
navigating a very fine line between defender of the common good and a puppet entity for big 
agriculture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
127
 Richard S. Kirkendall pp. 201-209.  
 
 
78 
  
Chapter Five 
Agribusinesses Take Notice: Maneuvering for Access to Federally Funded Water Projects 
“In the East and South, farming may be a way of life, but in California it is a business 
and it is run like a business.”  
-California farmer 
 
As the 1940s was an era of growth and shifting attitudes in the U.S. it was not surprising 
then that it was during this period that large landowners in California’s Central Valley really 
began to exert control over the publicly funded waters of the CVP.  Although many industrial 
farmers had initially been opposed to construction of the Central Valley Project because of 
restrictions on water use, some began to see the potential of such a grand undertaking and turned 
their attention to finding an easier way to get around the acreage limitation. Ultimately, 
agribusinesses did gain access to water from the CVP and SWP due, in part, to the amount of 
money and influence they had, making the intent of the acreage limitation largely 
meaningless.
128
  
The state of California had passed the Central Valley Project Act in 1933, but did not 
have the funds to begin work until they turned to the federal government for aid. Construction of 
the CVP began in the late 1930’s, when the nation was well into the Depression, and in the 1940s 
the United States found itself embroiled in WWII. Many saw this as a time for Americans to pull 
together, heal, and work toward defeating enemies abroad, which meant making the most of the 
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resources at home, including water for agriculture. Images of yeomen farmers doing their part to 
grow food for American soldiers and allied nations were powerful indeed and would have been 
difficult to counter, even if Americans were familiar with corporate farming. Consequently, talk 
of limiting the amount of water that a “farmer” could have access to must have seemed absurd to 
many Americans at the time. It was unlikely that many citizens understood agricultural 
economics or the difference between a family farm and an industrial farm, growing food in an 
efficient manner would have been the primary interest for most Americans.
129
 
In conjunction with the war efforts, large-scale growers also appeared to be arguing for 
more opportunities for small farmers via removal of the acreage limitation. In The Thirsty Land: 
the Story of the Central Valley Project, Robert De Roos revisits arguments presented by Senator 
Downey, and explains how owners with large estates made claims to the effect that limiting the 
amount of water a farmer could get from the CVP was unfair to small farmers as it would stifle 
their ability to expand and prosper. This was, after all, the goal of all businesses was it not? Why 
should small farms face punitive restrictions for trying to achieve the American Dream? By 
arguing in this way, corporate farmers appeared to be looking out for the “little guy” all the while 
perusing their own agenda. Agribusinesses were able make such claims because those who were 
unfamiliar with reclamation policy, which was most people, mistook the acreage limitation for a 
limit on the number of acres one could own instead of whether or not they could have access to 
CVP water for those acres.
130
 The acreage limitation was purposely presented in this way to the 
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general public in order to confuse and mislead them. Such tactics worked, slowly causing 
support for the limitation to waver across the state.  
Although some farmers and most other citizens may have genuinely misunderstood the 
acreage limitation to be about limits on land ownership but, De Roos says, politicians knew 
better as they had helped hammer out the language when seeking funding for the CVP.
131
 By 
conflating the number of acres that made a farm eligible to use CVP water with that of limiting 
land ownership, agribusiness and politicians were eventually able to manipulate public opinion 
and put an end to the restrictions altogether, although this would take some time. However, once 
public opinion softened on this issue, agribusinesses must have realized that they would be able 
to expand with few limitations, and many did. Of course, this expansion was not a cause for 
concern for most California residents until drought struck, but by then the genie was already out 
of the bottle.  
At the same time that the limitation was beginning to soften, farms that supported urban 
centers were also being pushed east, deeper into the arid Central Valley, making them even more 
dependent upon both public water and underground supplies. Part of the reason that farms were 
pushed eastward was that during WWII the population on the West Coast had increased 
substantially.  Many of the nation’s war production facilities were located in California, and as 
such, large numbers of working class Americans moved into cities and towns to find work.  As 
suburbs pushed up against the Coastal Mountains, many farms in the area were also pushed out 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
may have done, De Roos states, but politicians and corporate farmers knew better as the distinction was 
clearly made during negotiations to get federal funding for the water projects. In addition, many of the 
points made about farming as an industry and not a way of life correspond to those made by Donald 
Worster  in Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West, and Mark Reisner in 
Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water. De Roos infers and Worster plainly 
states that largescale irrigation projects cause a shift in farming from a local endeavor to part of a global 
market in which profit is the main purpose. Reisner, Worster, and De Roos all point to this shift in 
economic importance as problematic to both small farmers and to water use in general.  
131
 Ibid pp. 82-90. 
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into the dryer, southern half of the Central Valley. Even as farms moved inland, the demand for 
agricultural products was high, not only because of the war effort, but also because of the large 
numbers of people moving into the state.
132
 Consequently, the acreage limitation was less 
important for those establishing or relocating their farms than was ensuring access to dependable 
irrigation in the dry climate. Again, the focus was on increasing productivity, feeding the troops, 
and expanding American industries, not limiting them which the acreage limitation appeared to 
do.  
If productivity and efficiency wee the order of the day, then agribusiness fit the bill. As a 
general rule, larger farms tended to be more efficient and cost effective, not to mention lucrative, 
often producing more crops per acre than smaller farms. As the nation experienced considerable 
industrial expansion to meet war production quotas and domestic needs, it made sense that farms 
would also expand to produce food for the growing population within the state and to meet 
demands in foreign markets opened by war. Entrepreneurs of every ilk saw this as an opportunity 
to aid the nation and increase personal profits. It is not surprising then that the acreage limitation 
was seen as a hindrance by a great many people living in California. De Roos used the words of 
one farmer to make the point: “In the East and South, farming may be a way of life, but in 
California it is a business and it is run like a business.”133 Coupling these conditions with an 
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 “Whither California Agriculture: Up, Down or Out? Some Thoughts about the Future.” III. 
The Changing Structure of California Agriculture, Statistics, and Financial Indicators: 1950–2000.  The 
Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics, University of California. 
http://giannini.ucop.edu/pdfs/giannini04-1c.pdf.  This report shows the shift in production from the 
coastal areas of California to the interior from 1949 to 2000. Regions that were once the main supplier of 
citrus in the state began to see major shifts toward the Central Valley. Where Orange County had over 
60,000 acres planted to oranges in 1950, by 2000 it had only 115 acres. In 2000, the San Joaquin Valley 
accounted for 82 percent of the entire state’s orange production. Shifts out into the Central Valley may 
have gained traction in the 1940s, but they clearly did not stop. 
133
 De Roos, p.88.  This quote is relevant today. It is difficult to reconcile the image of Jefferson’s 
beloved yeoman farmer with the corporate farming so prevalent in the West.  Any disparaging remarks 
about water usage and farming are often taken as attacks on small or family-run outfits. Sometimes such 
arguments are redirected there by savvy politicians and corporate farmers themselves in an effort to vilify 
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increased sense of patriotism and all-out support of the war effort, limiting the amount of water a 
large farm could access was the antithesis of American sentiment.  
Seeing an opportunity to end the acreage limitation, the House passed a rivers and 
harbors bill in March of 1944. Presented by Representative Alfred J. Elliot, from California’s 
10
th
 District in Stanislaus and San Joaquin counties, this bill, had it passed in the Senate, would 
have exempted land irrigated by the Central Valley Project from the acreage limitation. Senator 
Downey attempted to push through a similar bill in 1947, but his was also rejected.
134
 Clearly, 
there was still opposition to ending the limitation altogether, but it was wavering. At this point, 
the Bureau of Reclamation was under a great deal of pressure from the general public, 
politicians, and large-scale farmers and finally began to soften its stance on limitation, if only 
unofficially. For instance, from 1945-1953, Michael Straus served as commissioner of the 
Bureau of Reclamation and during his term the “technical compliance” formula was introduced.  
This formula gave the appearance to the public that the limitation was still in place, for those that 
cared, and that family farms were protected. At the same time industrial farmers were made 
aware that the Bureau would not be enforcing the limitation to any real extent.
135
 From a 
distance, technical compliance seemed a simple solution, making most everyone involved in the 
water usage debate happy. However, this was neither a long-term solution, nor a sound one.  
Not everyone bought into this new strategy either, including the state Grange and 
Farmers Alliance. Early on in the water debate, both groups wrote articles in local newspapers 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
those making such arguments against granting water to larger farms. This has been a highly successful 
method of deflecting blame; unfortunately it has also limited the potential for discussion leading to real 
solutions to water usage issues.  
134
 Richard S. Kirkendall, p. 201, 209. 
135
 Lawrence B. Lee,  p. 404, 410. Technical compliance simply means that as long as it appeared 
to the public and/or the Bureau, that land owners met with the 320-acre maximum, they could purchase 
low-cost water from the CVP.  To “meet” the requirement, landowners could lease land to other people, 
in name only, or divide acreage by crops planted and apply for water for the different plantings; these 
were only the most obvious ways around the limitation.   
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and held town meetings in support of the acreage limitation and in an effort to communicate the 
importance of how water usage by large farming entities impacted small farms in California. By 
the late 1950’s, the state Grange had teamed up with the Federation of Labor to block the 
passage of laws that would allow state land and water projects to be exempt from the acreage 
limitation.
136
 The National Farm Union, the National Catholic Rural Life Conference, and the 
AFL-CIO backed senators Paul Douglas, Wayne Morse, and Hubert Humphrey as they debated 
an anti-family farm provision on the Senate floor in 1960.
137
 It was argued by their opponents 
that getting rid of the limitation would actually lead to an increase in the number of family farms 
across the state. This prediction was untrue, of course, and is evident in Figure 5.1 which 
illustrates a steep reduction in the number of farms between 1950 and 1960, and again between 
1960 and 1970.  This chart does not show the number of acres cultivated during this same time, 
which increased from 6.4 million in 1950 to 7.9 million by 1959, and again to 8.5 million by 
1978.
138
 In other words, there were fewer farms after the acreage limitation was eased but they 
were of greater size. This meant that more farmland had been consolidated by large landholders, 
exactly as supporters of the limitation had surmised. Ignoring or repealing the water limitation 
evidently did not boost the number of family farms in California; on the contrary it appeared to 
be killing them. Regardless of this evidence, it took almost a decade for supporters of the 
limitation to bring enough attention to the “technical compliance” policy to elicit change.  
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 Lee p. 418-420. Lee takes a much harsher view of the Bureau of Reclamation than some of his 
contemporaries.  He sees the Bureau as an agent of corporate farms, state business interests, and 
politicians. 
137
 Ibid p. 418-419. 
138
 “Wither California Agriculture:  Up, Down, or Out?” p. 1.  
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Figure 5.1 Number of Farms. Number of California Farms for Selected Years, 1950-2000.
139
 This chart 
shows a decrease in the number of farms in the state with significant drops in 1960 and 1970. These were 
the hallmark years of the technical compliance formula, showing that easing the restriction did not allow 
for the growth of small farms in the state. 
 
It was not until the late 1960’s that the excess-land law was again enforced to any real 
degree. Data simply did not support those who had argued that allowing the limitation to slide 
would give all farms, including family farms, greater opportunity to expand and thrive. For more 
than a decade no real growth in the number of family farms occurred in California. In the 
meantime, agribusinesses worked around the acreage limitation and procured water to bring new 
acres of land into production even though state engineer, Edward Hyatt, had clearly stated that 
the purpose of the CVP was to “…save one-half million irrigated acres from returning to desert. 
It is not a new land project, but a rescue project or relief enterprise for large areas now settled 
                                                          
139
 Ibid p. 15. This graph shows the reduction in the number of farms in California between the 
years 1950 and 1970. The number of acres planted also peaked in the 1950’s with a steady decline for the 
state overall, except in the San Joaquin Valley, which saw an increase in acres planted as farming shifted 
toward the center of the Valley and away from urban areas on the coast, in the south, and in the north.  
The most recent drought has caused many farmers to limit replanting or forced them to remove some 
acres from being used altogether. This graph, coupled with the information about the number of acres 
planted, would indicate that farmland often became consolidated. If the number of acres planted stayed 
the same or decreased in some areas, but the number of farms also decreased at a much faster rate, then 
the acres of farmland would have to be owned by a fewer number of land owners.  
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and developed…”140 In light of this, Senators Gaylord Nelson and Floyd Haskell held hearings in 
1975 and 1976 in Washington D.C. to determine if agribusinesses had colluded with CVP 
officials to avoid enforcement of the acreage limitation.
141
  
During the hearings a multitude of evidence was presented which was damning to both 
CVP officials and corporate farmers.  In 1976, Congress required the Bureau of Reclamation to 
enforce both the land limitation and the 1902 residency requirement that had originally been 
written into the Reclamation Act. However, the number of acres planted in the Central Valley 
actually increased between 1975 and 2000 just as it had between 1950 and 1978, even though the 
number of farms increased only nominally. This evidence seems to indicate that de facto 
enforcement was not as important as it appeared to be during the hearings.
142
 Unfortunately, after 
the unsettling hearings of the mid-1970s, the Bureau’s reputation did not recover, and by the end 
of the decade they found themselves under attack again, this time by those with environmental 
concerns. In the meantime, increases in both population and agricultural production had occurred 
well into the 1970s and the CVP had allowed that to happen. 
Approved in 1933, most of the Central Valley Project was not completed until the early 
1970’s. Not all of the components of the Project were actually constructed; some were cancelled, 
and others were contingent on approval. By the time most of the CVP was built, urban centers, 
small towns, and farmers in the Central Valley were utilizing water storage facilities and reaping 
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 De Roos, The Thirsty Land p. 44 This quote was part of the argument state engineer Edward 
Hyatt presented to California’s State Legislature and the federal government in his efforts to get federal 
funds for public water projects for the state of California.  This was, in part, how he gained support for the 
project from citizens in urban centers like San Francisco and Sacramento. De Roos points this out because 
more land was brought under development via the CVP, much of which was owned by agribusinesses.  
141
 Lee. 420. 
142
 “Whither California Agriculture: Up, Down, or Out?” p.7.  Given that the number of acres 
increased statewide from 900,000 in 1975 to 1.5 million in 2000, many of which are owned by large-scale 
farming entities, those holding the hearings may have had good intentions, but the “enforcement” 
appeared to be for show. 
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the benefits.  One of the main issues the CVP addressed for the northern half of the Central 
Valley, or Sacramento River Basin, was flood control along the Sacramento and feeder rivers.
143
 
This issue was resolved by storing water in the Trinity Reservoir, about 45 miles northwest of 
Redding, California. Trinity Reservoir stemmed the flow of water to the Sacramento River and 
the dam was used to generate hydroelectric power. Trinity had only half the capacity of the 
Shasta Reservoir, which is located on the Sacramento River 12 miles north of Redding. Shasta 
was the largest storage facility and producer of hydroelectric power within the CPV. The 
Tehama-Colusa Canal was constructed to run parallel to and divert water from the Sacramento 
River to Colusa County. Folsom Reservoir was built on the American River, east of Sacramento, 
and water from this storage facility was used in the Folsom South Canal and also produced 
hydroelectric power. More dams, canals, and pumping stations were constructed along the 
Sacramento River system, all of which helped to regulate floodwaters in the north and to regulate 
the amount of water that made its way into the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta. This helped 
maintain water levels for Delta farmers and kept the salinity levels in check.  
In the southern half of the Central Valley, the San Joaquin Valley, aridity was the prime 
issue, not flood control. The Delta Canal System diverted water from the Sacramento River and 
forced it southward, back toward the source of the San Joaquin River via canals and pumping 
stations. Dams along the San Joaquin River were used to divert water to storage facilities at 
                                                          
143
Ellen Hanak, Jay Lund, Ariel Dinar,  Brian Gray,  Richard Howitt, Jeffrey Mount,  Peter 
Moyle, Barton Thompson, “Ch.1 Floods, Droughts, and Lawsuits: A Brief History of California Water 
Policy.” Managing California’s Water From Conflict to Reconciliation. San Francisco:  Public Policy 
Institute of California, 2011. http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_211EHR.pdf . This information 
can be found in a variety of places, and descriptions of the CVP will be in varying degrees of completion 
depending upon the year the material was published.  The United States Geological Survey, in print and 
online, has similar information, as does Nikola P. Prokopovich’s article “Engineering Geology and the 
Central Valley Project,” American Water Works Association; 65, no. 3 (1973) :  pp. 186-194.  
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Millerton Reservoir, above the Friant Dam and to the Madera Canal which ran north and the 
Friant-Kern Canal which ran south to Bakersfield.
144
  These manmade networks allowed for 
agriculture to flourish in a fertile yet extremely arid region of the nation. Once initiated, the 
potential for growth was realized and, eventually, limits on irrigation water were no longer seen 
as necessary nor useful tools in a modern and global market economy. While many touted this 
transformation as a great success, the reasoning was problematic, especially when dealing with 
natural resources which were necessary for survival but were treated as if they were 
inexhaustible. Although water was a renewable resource, there were fluctuations in availability, 
even in areas that typically experienced heavy precipitation. The successful construction of 
dams, reservoirs, and hydroelectric stations may have given most Californians the sense that they 
had dominated their environment, but circumstances that arose in 2011 served as a stark 
reminder that this notion was little more than fantasy. 
Regardless of future consequences, in 1982, after years of struggle to keep the 160-acre 
limitation in place, the Bureau of Reclamation increased the limit to 960 acres.  This occurred as 
part of the deregulation and privatization movement under President Ronald Reagan and a 
conservative tide that swept the nation. Realistically, the Bureau had other issues to deal with, 
such as the impact that water use and relocation were having on the environment, specifically 
indigenous plant and animal life. At this point, sticking to and enforcing the Homestead 
limitation did not seem to be a fight they could continue to win. In addition, many saw the new 
limit as a benefit as it meant more farms could have access to CVP water and would need to rely 
less on underground sources, especially in the San Joaquin Valley. For some farmers the increase 
came as a great relief after facing a serious drought from 1976-77. Shifts in policy seemed to 
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 Ibid.  The State Water Project, a separate system, uses the California Aqueduct and branches 
to pump water roughly 700 miles from a pumping station near Tracy, California, to Silverwood Lake, in 
San Bernardino County. It runs parallel to both the San Joaquin River and the Friant-Kern Canal.  
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validate what critics had been saying all along: give water according to the amount of acres 
planted and meet the needs of the farmers. However, issues of land and water use did not simply 
fade away with the altered limitation. Given that data regarding well depth and acres of new 
cultivation in the southern San Joaquin at late as 2015, it appeared the water problem was 
exacerbated by the limit change. Because the acreage limitation did work to limit the size of 
farms, even if poorly, it also helped limit the impact drought had on crop prices, water quality, 
and increased soil salinity. When the limitation was altered and large-scale farmers found new 
and better ways around enforcement, growth in the San Joaquin Valley occurred and changed in 
ways that led to a litany of concerns for everyone impacted by California water use, not just 
farmers.     
 
Figure 5.2 Incomes. Net Farm Income in California, 1960-2000. (Billions)
145
 There were a variety of 
reasons that incomes rose steadily between 1970 and 2000, including inflation, higher yield crops, market 
demand, better fertilizer, and shifts in crop production.  A correlation can also be drawn between 
consolidation of farmland and increased incomes during these years. 
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 “Whither California Agriculture:  Up, Down, or Out?” p. 17. In this graph and the next, it is 
clear that the amount of money farmers have made in California has increased exponentially as has the 
value of their land. There is also a correlation between the lack of enforcement and the increase to the 
number of acres one could own in order to get water from the CVP.  Given the fact that most of the 
farmland in Southern California has been turned into urban and suburban developments and that the San 
Joaquin Valley has surpassed all other region in fruit and nut production, it is safe to say that farmers in 
this area have reaped the benefits of publicly funded water, without paying the full cost of construction. 
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Figure 5.3 Land Values. Average Values of Land and Buildings in Farms in California, 1950-2000.
146
 
The same reasons for increased incomes for farms can be used to explain increased land values, but 
improvements to the land and structures on the farms would also have been taken into account during 
assessment.  
 
It is important to see the patterns of landownership and the machinations employed by 
large landholders in order to gain access to water resources, but equally important is what role 
access to low-cost, publicly funded water has had in creating a self-perpetuating cycle of 
expansion and water shortage in the Central Valley. As agribusinesses gained access to low-cost 
water via the CPV, the more attractive expansion of their farmland became. As farmers 
experienced a steady increase in income and land value over the next fifty years, as indicated by 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3, expansion must have seemed even more alluring. It was dependable supplies 
of surface water which made expansion possible in the San Joaquin Valley and more acres were 
planted despite the characteristic aridity of the region. However, during regular periods of 
drought, when surface water was not available, farmers relied on groundwater as they had in the 
past. Eventually, the increased number of acres under cultivation created an unsustainable 
demand on those groundwater sources, causing water tables to fall and, in some cases, rendered 
aquifers useless as they collapsed completely. Farmers with smaller spreads were often unable to 
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compete with industrial farms as they did not have the economic resources to reach depleted 
groundwater. On many occasions desperate farmers sold their land to agribusinesses, as they had 
in the past, and the cycle repeated. The very fact that water was available to irrigate more 
farmland led to an overextension by owners of large-scale farms. This in turn wreaked havoc on 
the environment and small farmers and ultimately allowed for further consolidation of farmland 
to occur once yeoman farmers realize the difficulty of surviving, let alone thriving in, prolonged 
periods of water scarcity.   
Despite the glaring problems that occurred with increased access to water, the Central 
Valley Project, as previously noted, was viewed largely as a success. Effective flood controls 
were put in place, irrigation water turned the southern half of the Valley green for most of the 
year, and California was able to boast some of the most profitable crops in agricultural markets. 
However, a catch-22 developed in the state wherein the very success of the CVP led to increased 
vulnerability when droughts occurred with more frequency or lasted longer than was typical. 
Although small farmers did benefit from water provided by the CVP, large-scale operations 
benefited appreciably more. In addition, during periods of insufficient water supply industrial 
farmers were able to access water in deeper aquifers than were small farmers, allowing them to 
make profits even when there was less rainfall or water available from the CVP. Corporate farms 
also increased their shares in fruit and nut tree cultivation. As land planted to fruit and nut trees 
could not be fallowed water use was constant in orchards, even during drought, which led to 
even lower water tables in the Valley. This fact should have troubled the farming community, 
but there seemed to be little concern until the drought that began in 2011 hit its third straight 
year. 
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Use of water to make farmers and investors wealthy was bothersome to many residents of 
California not engaged in agricultural production of some sort. This issue was especially 
problematic for environmental historians Mark Reisner and Donald Worster, who argued that 
profits made by corporate farms, which also allowed for expansion of those farms, were done so 
at the taxpayers’ expense.147 De Roos came to this same conclusion in The Thirsty Land using 
calculations by Paul S. Taylor to support the argument that profits made by corporate farms far 
exceeded their share of construction and maintenance costs.
148
 Undoubtedly, residents benefited 
from public water facilities as these resources allowed them to meet their daily needs, and so it 
was right that they should pay their fair share to ensure continued access to this resource. 
However, residents did not make a profit from turning on their sink or watering their lawn and so 
made no monetary gain from using this resource while farmers did.  Further, agribusinesses 
could not have afforded to build the large-scale water relocation systems on which they 
depended, but they certainly were willing to use water from them to increase profits.
149
 This was 
but one problem with agricultural production in an increasingly profit driven society. 
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 Mark Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water. (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1985). Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the 
American West. (Viking Penguin Inc.: 1986) Both  also see corporate farms in California as entirely profit 
driven, making those running them less likely to worry about the environmental impact of pesticides,  
over-pumping of groundwater, or the economic and social conditions of the workers and communities 
that depend upon wages from working on such farms. Worster points to the capitalist system as being the 
main problem in the mismanagement of land and resources using the Dust Bowl as a prime example of 
just how much impact the drive to conquer nature and make money have on the land and everything 
connected to it. In the case of the Dust Bowl, capitalism led to a disconnect between people and the 
environment in which they lived leading to disastrous consequences, there is little difference in the role 
capitalism has played in California’s water crisis, it is only the details that vary.  
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 De Roos pp. 86-89. 
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 “Central Valley Project,” Water Education Foundation. 2014. Accessed October 15, 2015. 
According to this not-for-profit, foundation, farmers in the Central Valley have until 2030 to pay for dams 
constructed in the 1960s which total $497 million dollars. As of 2008, farmers had only paid back 15 
percent of the total cost. Profits made by farmers using water from the CVP are far in excess of this 
number. Agribusinesses continue to make huge profits, switching fields to the most profitable crop type 
regardless of water consumption or impact on the environment.   
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Additionally, an immediate need by investors to make money overrode the long-term 
impact of any methods used to achieve that end, even in agriculture. A good description of this 
process and the possible consequences were presented in Worster’s Dust Bowl, which chronicled 
the natural and manmade disaster that struck the middle of the United States in the 1930’s and 
again in the 1950’s. Worster argued that it was both the changes that occurred in a society as it 
became more capitalistic and the notion that man can dominate nature which led to the duration 
and intensity of the Dust Bowl. In this case, small farmers and agribusinesses alike competed for 
more shares of the agricultural market only to deplete the land of vital nutrients, plants that 
prevent soil erosion, and to cultivate acres beyond a farmer’s ability to be productive in times of 
drought. Even when farmers realized they needed to change their practices and the ways they 
viewed the land in general, as soon as the crisis was over and the sense of urgency passed, they 
slipped back into complacency regarding farming practices, confident that they would be able to 
dominate their surroundings once again. This confidence led farmers in the Midwest to behave in 
the same ways they had prior to the decade of drought and sandstorms, leading to similar results 
in the 1950’s. In much the same way the CVP and SWP gave many California residents a false 
sense of triumph over nature, causing the same problems regarding water to surface again and 
again.  
 In essence, the long history of land consolidation, investment agriculture, and political 
structures that supported the almost despotic control of resources by a wealthy few in the name 
of capitalism and the free market were left unchecked for far too long. What remained unclear 
was if anyone that subscribed to a capitalist society could ever address water use issues in a way 
that would evoke the necessary changes to elude a crisis. What was clear however, were the 
consequences that occurred because law makers had neglected to deal in any real way with land 
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and water issues in California. Simply put, problems such as aquifer collapse, water shortages, 
soil salinity, and intermittent water restrictions had compounded over time and the people of the 
state found themselves in a real dilemma, one that pitted residents of urban and rural 
communities, small farmers and large farmers, environmentalists and pro-business leaders 
against one another. This division did nothing to solve the problems that persisted and may even 
have perpetuated the systems of power that contributed to the problems in the first place. 
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Chapter Six 
Legacies of Power: Consequences of Expanding Farmland in the Central Valley 
“Water, water, water.... There is no shortage of water in the desert but exactly the right 
amount, a perfect ratio of water to rock, water to sand, insuring that wide, free, open, generous 
spacing among plants and animals, homes and towns and cities, which makes the arid West so 
different from any other part of the nation. There is no lack of water here unless you try to 
establish a city where no city should be.” 
      -Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire: A Season in the Wilderness
150
 
 
Anyone who has driven through the San Joaquin Valley on I-5 or CA 99 between May 
and September has seen rolling hills covered in dry grass. From Merced to Kern County, long 
stretches of road were paralleled by hills that looked as if they had been covered in golden 
velvet, unbroken by other vegetation save an occasional oak. It should be surprising then to 
suddenly be driving alongside orchards of almond and fruit trees where no trees grew of their 
own accord. Fields of grapes, roses, and carrots flanked the interstate, and everywhere were signs 
indicating that “food grows where water flows.”  This statement is fascinating as the southern 
half of the San Joaquin Valley receives only between five and sixteen inches of rainfall annually, 
which was not enough precipitation to support such grand agricultural efforts, even when 
groundwater sources were taken into account.
 151
  The southern half of the San Joaquin is a 
desert, albeit a desert with very fertile soil. And yet, this region led the nation in nut and fruit 
production, among other agricultural products in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
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 I use this quote by environmental activist and author Edward Abbey, best known for his novel 
The Monkey Wrench Gang, even though he is referring to building a city “where it doesn’t belong.” 
Farms can also be located in places where they don’t belong, like the desert. This can and does lead to 
tension between groups vying for access to water in such an environment.  
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 Devin Galloway and Francis S. Riley “San Joaquin Valley, California:  Largest Human  
Alteration of the Earth’s Surface,” U.S. Geological Survey. Menlo Park, CA.,  pubs.usgs.gov. This report 
describes the natural and manmade water networks in the Central Valley. Galloway and Riley examine 
the consequences of pumping water from underground sources in the San Joaquin Valley, including land 
compaction, subsidence, and soil salinity. The charts, maps, and photographs in this report are very easy 
to understand and help clarify the written report. 
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centuries.
152
  The only reason this part of the state was able to become so productive was because 
of the CVP and the SWP. Without this dependable and inexpensive water source, such farming 
would have been impossible. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Dry Hills. As indicated by the road sign in the photo, this image was taken about 35 miles 
outside of Bakersfield.  The vegetation is sparse and even the dirt on the side road is dry and appears 
almost grey. The closer the drive to Bakersfield, the greener the scenery becomes, not due to natural 
growth, but rather from intensive irrigation.  Image is courtesy of Stefani Evans, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas 2014. 
 
The number of acres brought under cultivation in the Central Valley since the 1950’s was 
exponential.  By 1950 the number of acres being farmed had reached 6.4 million and by 1959 
that number had jumped to 7.4 million. It is no coincidence that this was when the technical 
compliance formula was put in use. It is also interesting to note that there was no appreciable 
increase in the number of farms during this jump in acreage. Most of the increase in cultivated 
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 “Agriculture: Farms and Farmland,” Giannini Foundation p.3. This report by the Giannini 
Foundation contains data regarding agricultural production for the State of California from 1950 to 2000. 
In the report, crop production, ranching, dairy, farm size, and farm value are broken down by county. This 
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acres was done by the expansion of corporate farms in the Valley, which according to data 
collected in 1997, experienced an increase of acres planted reaching 8.7 million.
153
 In 2000, there 
were 28,000,000 acres of agricultural land, including grazing land, statewide.  That number 
dropped in 2010 to 25,000,000 due to the growth of urban areas and in an effort to remedy 
environmental problems caused by water relocation.
154
 And, although the number of acres and 
farms decreased across the state, parts of the southern half of the San Joaquin Valley continued 
to see growth, at least until the drought beginning in 2011. There were several reasons for growth 
in this particular part of the state. One reason was the water made available by public works used 
for agriculture. Another reason for the expansion of farming in this area was a population 
increase, especially around Los Angeles and the upper San Joaquin Valley, which led to the 
proliferation of urban and suburban development into old farming and ranching communities. In 
addition, the excellent soil and the longest growing season in the Central Valley allowed farmers 
to plant a greater variety of crops, making the Southern San Joaquin Valley an expedient option 
for farmers and investors. 
Chiefly because of the long growing season, fertile soil, and availability of irrigation 
water, the San Joaquin Valley dominated almost every agricultural commodity the state 
produced. As noted in previous chapters, Los Angeles used to be the largest producer of citrus 
fruits in California, with 80 percent of the state’s oranges coming from this region. That title was 
held by the San Joaquin Valley beginning in the late 1990s, as farmers in this area produced 82 
percent of the oranges versus Southern California’s 18 percent.155 The Sacramento Valley 
produced 50 percent of the state’s almonds in 1950; by 2000, the San Joaquin Valley was 
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producing 80 percent and the Sacramento Valley only 20 percent. Beginning in 1969, five 
counties in the San Joaquin Valley made the list of top ten agricultural producers in the state. 
Since 1992, those same counties, Fresno, Tulare, Monterey, Kern, and Merced, were in the top 
five for agricultural production.
156
 Of those five, three counties, Fresno, Kern, and Tulare, 
receive less than fourteen inches of rain annually. 
Given the level of success California agriculture has had, many would argue that it was a 
good thing that more food was being produced in the Central Valley. Some may even wonder 
why it mattered that the San Joaquin Valley produced so much of the agricultural commodities 
for California; they may correctly point out that more food production meant lower prices for 
consumers. In addition, the number of acres planted statewide also declined between 2005 and 
2015, so increased agricultural development in the San Joaquin Valley seemed like a good thing. 
The problem was that many of the crops being farmed were very water-thirsty plants. Generally 
speaking, corporate farms were concerned with profits, not with consumer costs or the long-term 
consequences of their farming techniques, so they were more likely to plant crops that needed 
more water to produce a harvest. On the other hand, most family-run farms, even large ones, 
tended to be more concerned with the long-term impact of their farming practices because they 
intend for their land to remain in their family for generations. For clarity, corporate farms were 
not necessarily large nor are family farms necessarily small, but it was typical that agribusinesses 
had more acres than did family or cooperative farmers.
157
 This meant that using water to produce 
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crops in order to make money was the primary goal of corporate farms, even if it meant planting 
water thirsty plants on thousands of acres of arid land.  
With greater acres converted to plants that required more water than row crops, corporate 
farms led the way in increased water use.  A great deal of what was produced in California was 
also exported to foreign markets. This meant that farmers used publicly subsidized water to 
irrigate crops that they then sold overseas.
158
  Many residents in the northern half of the Central 
Valley, especially farmers, resented this practice, as water from their river system was diverted 
to support agriculture in the southern half where planters then made profits off of the water 
supply. Thus, farming practices in the southern half of the San Joaquin Valley impacted residents 
and farmers the Sacramento River Valley, such as Winters, Marysville, and Yuba City. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Trees.  Nut trees growing along CA-99. (Courtesy Stefani Evans, 2014.) The importance of 
such images cannot be overstated. Here, nut trees have been dusted with some sort of pesticide. The trees 
appear to be healthy as they grow full and low to the ground. But, if one looks closely they can see the dry 
earth and dead plant matter that runs between the rows of trees.  Rainfall is not keeping these trees alive; 
they are green and lush from waters supplied by canals and aquifers.  In the distance dead grass suitable 
for grazing covers the rolling hills, but no other plant life is apparent, especially not trees.  
 
Historically, farmers allowed fields lie fallow during dry seasons and let aquifers 
recharge during wet seasons. Row crops, like lettuce, broccoli, and sunflowers, were irrigated 
during or after wet seasons, harvested, and then the field would sit fallow until it was time to 
replant. This seemed both practical and responsible, especially in the arid southern part of the 
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state. Unfortunately, this traditional method of farming seemed to have been dispensed with in 
order to make year-round profits. In fact, some farmers sowed even more land with plants that 
required not just more water, but more water all year long.
159
 Fruit and nut trees, along with 
grapes, became the crops of choice for many farmers in the San Joaquin Valley. These crops had 
high yields and increased steadily in price per pound between 2000 and 2016. The Valley also 
saw an increase in the number of acres planted with almond trees during this same period. In 
fact, the Almond Board of California stated that the number of acres planted with almonds 
increased by 20,000 to 30,000 every year beginning in 1995 at the latest.
160
 Although this 
translated to lower prices for almonds in grocery stores, it also meant year-round water supplies 
were needed for harvests placing an even greater demand on already sparse resource. As a result, 
water overdraft and shortages increased throughout the state as the drought intensified in severity 
and extent. 
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Figure 6.3 The Scarlet Letter. How almond growers feel they are being treated in California, by Jack 
Ohman. This is just one of many cartoons depicting farmers who felt as though they were scapegoats 
during the water crisis. This image seems to be giving credence to more than one view on the issue of 
water use. First, it is clearly a play on how almond growers viewed their treatment by society at large, but 
the cartoonist also shows the almond grower standing waist deep in water, seeming to indicate that there 
may be something to the perception that almond growers got more than their fair share of water during the 
drought.
161
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Figure 6.4 Residents v Big Agriculture. 'California imposes water restrictions' by Daryl Cagle. This, 
like so many other cartoons, shows two policies for water use, one for residents and another for “Big 
Agriculture.”162 This image hits all the machinations that Californians felt were at work in their state 
regarding water policy. First, the governor set steep restrictions on residents and imposed fines and 
penalties as well. But, Governor Brown and other politicians placed very few restrictions on 
agribusinesses and claimed that the government had no right to tell farmers what to do on their land, 
especially if it had a negative economic impact on those farmers.  Californians were confused if not 
angered by this double standard. 
 
During the 2011 drought, almond farmers in California indicated that they felt they had 
been vilified in the press. Political cartoons were published between 2011 and 2016, like those 
above, which captured the perceived differences experienced by almond growers and residents in 
California. It is apparent from both cartoons that neither group felt their needs were being 
addressed adequately and that perceived inequalities were a major issue.  Many almond growers 
rightly pointed out other types of crops required just as much water to produce a harvest as did 
almond trees. What they failed to acknowledge was that during episodes of drought, farmers 
                                                          
162
 Daryl Cagle, ‘California Imposes Water Restrictions’ Cagle Cartoons at the Comic  
News. Accessed October 31, 2016. http://thecomicnews.com/edtoons/2015/0408/california/04.php. 
 
 
 
 
102 
  
could simply leave their fields unplanted, whereas trees required water all year, whether there 
was a drought or not. A walnut or pomegranate grower could not simply stop irrigating the 
orchard as the economic losses would have been profound. Tomato growers, on the other hand, 
would be able to leave fields fallow or grow less irrigation-intensive crops for a season or two 
and not suffer the same revenue loss as those with unirrigated orchards. This would be especially 
true in arid regions, like the San Joaquin Valley. 
Worth noting is that most of the shifts toward planting fruit and nut trees began with 
corporate farms. In 2007, of the 5,750 corporate farms in California, 2,674 were fruit and nut tree 
farms, and through 2015 even more acres were converted from row crops to fruit and nuts in the 
San Joaquin Valley.
163
 For example, in 2014 it was noted in an article in the Western Farm Press 
that “Paramount Farming [had] recently purchased 15,000 acres of row-crop land in Madera 
County from Newhall Land Co., which likely will be planted to almonds, pistachios, or 
pomegranates. Paramount farms about 30,000 acres of almonds, 25,000 acres of pistachios, and 
6,000 acres of pomegranates in the southern San Joaquin Valley.”164 Paramount was an 
agricultural empire owned by Lynda and Stewart Resnick located in Kern County.  By 2014, 
Paramount also had thousands of acres planted to pomegranate trees and produced 20 percent of 
the state’s citrus. Those competing with Paramount in markets and for access to irrigation water 
claimed that control of so much of the pistachio market allowed Resnick to manipulate long 
standing organizations and regulation regarding water use. This had a familiar ring to it, as these 
were the same charges that Miller, Lux, and other land barons of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century faced. 
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Moreover, it was not just row crops that were converted to orchards; land that was once 
used for cattle grazing was also planted with water-thirsty crops. In Stanislaus County, 6,500 
acres of grazing land were converted to almonds in 2013 by Trinitas Partners, an investment firm 
in the Silicon Valley.
165
 Even in the midst of the drought that began in 2011, newly planted fruit 
and nut trees lined the roadways for miles near Wasco, CA. The purposes of these types of 
“investment farms” were exactly what the name implies, to get a return on an investment. Family 
farms, especially small farmers, adapted to these methods or found they were unable to compete. 
This meant that more water was pumped from wells during dry seasons and even more so during 
years of drought. What should be of great concern to California law makers and residents alike, 
is that much of that water went to vast tracts of land consolidated during the early years of 
California’s statehood.  
To emphasize, Paramount and Trinitas were not an anomaly; many of the farms in the 
Central Valley were tens of thousands of acres in size and belong, not to family farmers, but to 
agribusinesses. Farms of such size would have been impossible to irrigate in dry years without 
access to dependable water, leaving smaller more flexible farmers in the majority. Smaller farms 
were usually more flexible in the sense that they would be able to determine what to plant or 
change farming strategies without having to worry about pleasing investors. Granted, such 
farmers would still need to make a living, but would also be able to go a year without increased 
revenue as long as they were able to pay their debts or have access to credit. Unfortunately, that 
simply was not the case in the San Joaquin Valley. In 1997, agribusinesses accounted for sixteen 
percent of the farms in California, but they made up 91 percent of the sales for the state. 
Nationwide, these farms accounted for sixty-seven percent of agricultural production.
166
 In other 
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words, there were a lot of family farms in the 1990’s that were not making near the dollar 
amount that corporate farms were, placing them at a considerable disadvantage.  
On the whole, large corporate farms were not practical without water to irrigate the land; 
this was especially true when they were located in arid regions. But, such large landholdings 
often meant there was a considerable amount of money and influence by which the 
owners/operators could acquire the water they needed to be successful and profitable. In order to 
garner access to the appropriate amount of irrigation water, industrial farm often employed the 
services of farm lobbies. Like lobbyists for any other industry, farming lobbies pushed for access 
to water in order to make more profits. Granted, not all farms represented by lobbyist were 
corporate farms, but many in California were, specifically those located in the southern San 
Joaquin Valley Westlands Water District which represented farms in excess of 25,000 acres. In 
2013 the Westlands Water District, the largest water district in the United States representing 
farm interests between Firebaugh and Kettleman City, increased monies spent in Washington to 
ten times what it had in 2010.
167
  One goal of Westlands was to get legislation that would 
reestablish contracts for another forty years and limit the ability of state and federal agencies to 
restrict water during drought. Just such a bill was passed by the House in 2015 and a similar bill, 
which was being considered in the Senate, did not. If it had passed, the Senate bill “would allow 
regulators to ‘provide the maximum quantity of water supplies possible’ to where it’s most 
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needed and boost existing federal drought programs by $200 million.”168 The obviously vague 
wording was intended to allow specific farming entities to have access to more water during 
drought, even at the expense of other water districts, farms, residences, and over environmental 
concerns. Given that the words “most needed” would indicate greatest impact to revenue or jobs, 
it could easily have been assumed this water would have gone to corporate farms.  
State and local agencies were also targeted by agricultural interest groups to ensure 
access to water during hard times. Donations of nearly five million dollars were made by 
Parmount Farming Company to federal and state politicians on both sides of the isle as well as 
special action committees, presumably to influence their decisions regarding Paramount’s water 
rights in 2014.
169
 Rebranded as the Wonderful Company in 2009, the Resnicks acquired public 
land via dealings with state water officials in 1994 under which aquifers with plentiful water 
supplies were located. The Kern Water Bank, as the aquifers were called, made it possible for 
Wonderful to use more water than any other farm in the region without purchasing it from the 
CVP or SWP if they were not inclined to do so.
170
 However, aquifers used by the Paramount 
Farms were partially replenished by water pumped from the Sacramento River Delta, technically 
part of the public water system. As a result, the Resnicks and their subsidiary holdings were sued 
repeatedly for over pumping from aquifers and depleting water resources available to 
surrounding water districts and farmlands. In addition, Agribusinesses were also able to afford to 
dig a 2,500-foot well while a family-owned farm would be far less likely to, as was the case with 
Paramount Farms which sunk eighty-five wells into the Kern Water Bank as soon as it was 
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signed over to the corporation. As of 2015, reminiscent of Charles Miller vs Henry Lux, the 
Resnicks were once again fighting charges that the Kern Water Bank had been over pumped to 
the detriment of neighboring farms and communities.
171
   
Corporate farms, like Paramount, also influenced water politics indirectly, and by 
extension, local economies as well. In 2007, Paramount Farms was able to put an end to the 
twenty-six-year old California Pistachio Commission. This was possible even though two-thirds 
of the pistachio growers in California voted to keep it. Voting was tallied, not by the number of 
growers, but by the percentage of crop, and Paramount continued to lead the state in pistachio 
production in 2016.
172
 Such measures of power really did underscore the ways in which 
capitalism undermined the one person, one vote doctrine that American democracy is based 
upon. This also harkens back to tactics used by Miller & Lux to avoid paying the correct amount 
of property tax on their land by getting men who were friendly to them elected or appointed to 
key positions at the state and local level. Paramount may have used more modern and 
sophisticated measures to achieve their goals, but that was only a measure of degree as their 
influence was still garnered through the amount of land and wealth they had. 
Equally important was the fact that a sustained focus on farming, especially by 
agribusiness, limited the diversification of the economy in the San Joaquin Valley, even within 
agricultural production itself. In fact, by 2015 roughly 70 percent of farms in California produced 
only a single crop for market. Reminiscent of the study conducted by Goldschmidt, U.S. Census 
data regarding poverty in America from the 2010s revealed that, not only had the economic 
opportunities not increased in many parts of the San Joaquin Valley, but they had gotten worse in 
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some cases. In the city of Arvin, where Goldschmidt found less opportunity, lower wages, and 
poor living conditions for agricultural workers in 1944, the number of people living below the 
poverty line was 36 percent between 2002 and 2012. The national average for people living 
below the poverty line for the same years was 15 percent.
173
 In Dinuba, which Goldschmidt 
described as the model of a family-farming community, the poverty level reached 30 percent as 
farming became more corporatized. Larger cities with farming hinterlands, like Fresno, have 
poverty levels of just over 18 percent. In 2010, The Economist ran an article in which poverty in 
the San Joaquin Valley was compared to that in Appalachia.
174
 This appears to bear out the 
argument put forth by both McWilliams and Worster, which was that communities with an 
economy largely dependent on agribusinesses tended to have more wage workers and fewer 
professionals and educated residents. This created a cycle of poverty and dependence which was 
difficult to break and is exactly what historians, including Taylor and Goldschmidt, warned 
would occur if corporate growers were left unchecked. 
What may be even more striking was that in the land of plenty, many residents, especially 
those that were the most vulnerable, experienced high rates of food insecurity. In 2015, 
Bakersfield and Fresno, cities at either end of the San Joaquin Valley, ranked in the top five 
cities with populations who faced food scarcity, as illustrated in the table on page 109.  
Bakersfield is located in Kern County which was the fourth most productive agricultural county 
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in California in 2105, producing melons, lettuce, almonds, nectarines, etc., which were shipped 
to more than eighty-five countries worldwide, and yet it ranked number one in food hardship for 
that same year.
175
 Fresno, located in at the northern end of the San Joaquin Valley, was number 
one in agricultural production for California in 2015. For that same year, Freson also ranked fifth 
in food hardship. According to the Unites States Department of Agriculture, California had a 
food insecurity index of one out of every eight homes for 2015, which was an improvement from 
previous years. Their research indicated that food insecurity tended to be higher in homes with 
children and increased when the family was Hispanic. Much of the seasonal labor in California 
had traditionally been comprised of immigrants from Mexico, although first and second 
generation citizens and permanent residents often continued to work in agriculture. It was within 
these communities, seasonal, earning low wages, and with little political voice, that food scarcity 
hit the hardest. Corporate farms continued to make billions off the backs of such groups but kept 
pay so low that buying food for laboring families was sometimes a hardship.  
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Table 2 Food Hardship. State ranking from the Food Research and Action Center and the California 
Association of Food Banks.
176
 This table indicates the food hardship rates in the top nineteen cities in the 
U.S. for 2015.  California has two cites in the top five, both of which are located in highly developed 
agricultural areas. There was enough food produced in California during that same year to reach an output 
of 47 million dollars, which was down from the previous year. During both years, California ranked 
number one in agricultural production in the nation, and yet residents in the heart of agricultural 
productivity went hungry.  
 
 
 
Unlike the field laborers that work on the land, owners of agribusinesses experienced a 
steady increase in profits since the 1950s. In 2012, growers in Fresno County alone made $6.8 
billion in revenues. In addition, most farms, large and small, typically employ some number of 
migrant workers, primarily Hispanics, whom, as noted earlier, they paid low wages for back-
breaking work.
177
 Although some growers claimed laborers could earn eighteen dollars an hour, 
agricultural wages were based on output and high wages could only be achieved by those with 
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the most speed and experience. Slower, weaker, or older laborers made far less than this and 
wages were typically determined by piecework which varied by crop. And, as these types of 
agricultural jobs were also seasonal, they did not translate well into average daily or annual 
wages for most laborers. In addition, workers often found it difficult to find housing near the 
fields in which they worked due to the transient nature of their labor. Occasionally, some 
resorted to staying in their cars, outside in tents, or building some type of temporary structure.
178
 
Many of the laborers were poorly educated and had very little control over their own lives, let 
alone local or state politics. This meant that it was very unlikely that they would be able to take 
any action to remedy low wages and poor working and living conditions. 
 For the most part, social and economic conditions agricultural laborers found themselves 
in fed the cycle of poverty that some in the Central Valley continued to face as late as 2016. 
Even more, laborers were directly impacted by the drought as fewer acres planted also meant 
fewer jobs or lower wages. This was a difficult situation for a group in which more than a fifth 
already lived below the poverty line.
179
 Social stratification had long-term consequences for 
entire communities and local economies as workers had less money to spend in the markets, 
reducing revenues for local businesses and circulation of monies within the community. 
However, corporate farms continued to make profits as much of the agricultural production was 
for distant markets, not for local consumption.  
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As early as the 1970s, but even more so during the 2011 drought, many farmworkers also 
had to put up with contaminated drinking water. Many families were forced to spend their hard-
earned money on bottled and filtered water to ensure they had clean drinking water for their 
families. The very jobs fieldworkers depend upon contaminated the ground water that they could 
once drink. Pesticides and fertilizers used on fields and in orchards ran off and made their way 
into the groundwater.
180
  When surface or subsidized water was not available, the use of 
underground sources by farms became prolific. As a result, the more farmers pumped water from 
aquifers for irrigation, the more concentrated the contamination became. Families that were 
working all day in the fields and then still finding it difficult to afford food were now forced to 
purchase clean drinking water or take the risk of drinking contaminated well water.  
Problems with water contamination did not only impact the human population, but plant 
and animal life were affected as well. There were numerous attempts to remedy contaminated 
water supplies, over salinization, and water shortages that impacted the environment and the 
humans that depended upon them. For example, in 1992, Congress passed the Central Valley 
Project Improvement Act which requires changes made to water management within the system. 
The purpose of this Act was to remedy water shortages that limited the ability of certain fish 
species to migrate and spawn and to make sure that water was clean enough for human 
consumption and to sustain native plant and animal life. Efforts to maintain clean water supplies 
were in the public eye at both the state and national level beginning in the 1970’s, and yet they 
continued to be issues as the drive for profits repeatedly overrode environment concerns.  
Not only did ground water become contaminated by runoff from farms, but salinity levels 
in the soil also seeped into the water supply. Salinity levels had been increasing in aquifers and 
soil all across the state, but most notably in the San Joaquin Valley since farming began in the 
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area.
181
 Due to the aridity in the lower part of the Valley combined with intense irrigation and the 
already high amounts of salt in the soil, salinity levels became even more concentrated. There 
was simply too little rainfall, too much evaporation, and constant absorption of water by crops 
that led to increased amounts of salt left in the soil. When salinity levels get too high or are 
experienced for prolonged periods, plants will eventually not be able to grow well as high levels 
of salt make it difficult for roots to absorb nutrients and water for proper growth. In fact, this was 
already a problem for many almond and pistachio growers, some of whom saw the number of 
empty pistachio shells increase by 50 percent in 2015.
182
 It was normal to have some amount of 
empty shells during every harvest, but due to the prolonged drought that began in 2011 and the 
level of salt concentrated in the soil the number of empty shells increased considerably for nut 
growers in the Valley. In an effort to remedy salinity concentration, farmers were able to leach 
out minerals by using more water in order to force salt below or away from the root system of 
their crops, but did so at the risk of reducing the already low water table.
183
  
Furthermore, as many farmers switched over to year-round crops, they exacerbated the 
salinity problem because irrigation and absorption took place all year, leaving more salt than if it 
were a seasonal occurrence. This was very difficult to resolve with fruit and nut trees as their 
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root systems were very deep and they already required a great deal of water to produce a harvest. 
However, nuts were a very profitable commodity and many growers were willing to take the risk 
of empty shells and depleted water sources for the potential of increased earnings. In effect, 
farmers created their own worst-case scenario in the San Joaquin Valley with the farming 
practices they employed. Given that it was already difficult to get water to the southern half of 
the state, demands to increase water use in order to leach out the salts made matters even worse.  
Even though farmers needed more water to reduce salinity, during the drought growers 
saw a reduction in the amount of water they received from the CVP.  As such, many farmers put 
forth great effort to limit the amount of water they wasted while irrigating. In fact, new methods 
of irrigation were put into place by most farmers in California in order to help save both water 
and money long before the 2011 drought began.  Drip systems had replaced irrigation ditches 
that used flooding methods, and sprinkler systems could be seen in use along the I-5 or CA-99 
almost any time of the year. However, according to studies conducted at the University of 
California, Davis in 2015, many almond growers were once again looking at flooding fields as 
an irrigation technique.
184
 This was done by some vineyards in the region with good results.  
Grapevines typically experience tremendous growth and higher yields during dry years when 
they have received water via controlled flooding during wet seasons. Reducing the rate of soil 
salinization was also a possibility when using this process, but the best news seemed to be that 
this process might also lead to a recharge of depleted aquifers. This remained to be seen as of 
2016, but hopes were high amongst farmers and residents who had traditionally depended upon 
water from these dwindling resources.  
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Figure 6.5 State Subsistence. This map shows the levels of subsidence in the San Joaquin Valley from 
1920 to 1970.
185
 The image of Dr. Poland in Chapter Two provides a real-life example of what this 
illustration shows. New reports indicate that land had sunk even more during the 2011 drought, due no 
doubt, to the collapse of more aquifers.  If this pattern of subsistence continues, it is not an absurd notion 
that this area will no longer be viable for farming to the degree it had been, even with irrigation water 
from the CVP or SWP. The expansion of farmland that has occurred thus far will simply be too great to 
be sustained during periods of drought without any reliance upon underground sources, and those could 
well be gone in the near future.  
 
If it these methods worked, flooding fields would ensure more water availability during 
dry periods and keep aquifers intact helping to limit land subsidence.
186
 Figure 6.5 illustrates just 
how much of the Valley experienced subsidence between 1920 and 1970. During the 2011 
drought even more aquifers were pumped dry causing subsidence in many of the same areas, 
indicating loss of subterranean resources. Trying this older method of periodic flooding made 
sense as this was the way Central Valley aquifers recharged naturally but was not used often as it 
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seemed counter intuitive and appeared incredibly wasteful during drought years. For farmers, the 
problem that remained was that much of the water they used for irrigation actually came from 
someplace else and might not always be available in the quantities necessary to achieve vine 
growth, reduced salinity, or aquifer recharge on a regular basis. Thus, periodic flooding of fields 
was still a risky venture for many San Joaquin growers. 
 
 
 
 
 
As a consequence of the drought, farmers were not the only ones asked to cut back on 
water use in California after 2011. In fact, restrictions on water use within urban areas and rural 
communities were imposed almost every time there was a drought in California, and there was 
no exception in this case. It is important to note that water restrictions imposed on urban and 
rural residents were most often met by the residents and were even surpassed in some locations. 
In other words, not only were residents able to meet the requirement, but vert often they actually 
conserved more than was expected. To be fair, urban, suburban, and rural communities had 
expanded all over the state, especially in the southern and central part, but the percentage of 
water allocated to them had not.
187
 And, although it is true that by 2011 California was even 
more urban than it was fifty years prior, much more had been done preemptively to lessen the 
impact urban and suburban developments had on water supplies. For instance, in 2016, roughly 
ninety-four percent of California’s nearly 40 million residents lived in or around urban centers, 
with only six percent residing in rural areas, however, within urban areas water use per person 
had actually gone down considerably between 1995 and 2015, from 232 gallons per person each 
day to 178 gallons per day.
188
 Even though the difference in population between 1995 and 2016 
had increased by roughly 7.1 million people, the reduction in water use per person was 
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significant enough to make the total amount of water used by residents to be less than it had in 
1995. Thus, residents had made changes to water usage during years of normal water supply 
which should have translated into more water storage to be used during years with less than 
normal precipitation. Instead, more restrictions were eventually imposed and some rural 
communities ran out of water altogether.  
As a result of increased population and urban growth, some agricultural publications 
predicted that the amount of farmland that would be lost to urban development by 2040 was 
disturbingly high. Fear regarding crop production, price, and water use was considerable in such 
publications. In truth, urban centers would continue to grow over time as did suburban sprawl, 
but farmers had been employing new farming techniques and specialized crops for a very long 
time. Such measures allowed farmers to grow more food in increasingly smaller spaces. Higher 
yield crops, drought and disease-resistant plants, hydroponic farming, not to mention specially 
formulated fertilizers and pesticides, all made it possible for more crops to make it to market. 
Besides, the greater numbers of residents in urban areas also meant more consumers to buy those 
crops once they reached those markets. Of course, none of this would matter if there was no 
longer enough water to sustain urban centers or agricultural production.  
Concerns regarding water shortage were well founded by 2016, as the lack of rainfall and 
snow pack in the Sierra Nevada Mountains, which had begun in 2011, led to extremely low 
levels of surface water. As a consequence, large landholders, small farmers, and residents alike 
began to rely heavily on underground sources once again. In the drier half of the San Joaquin 
Valley, roughly 85 percent of the residents relied on groundwater to meet their daily needs.
189
  
Although some growers were forced to limit the number of acres they planted because they did 
                                                          
189
 Janny Choy and Geoff McGhee, “Groundwater: Ignore It, and It Might Go Away. 
Understanding California’s Groundwater,” Water in the West, Stanford Woods Institute for the 
Environment. Last Update: Dec. 19, 2014. http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/groundwater.   
 
 
117 
  
not have access to enough water, still others continued to shift to crops that required a great deal 
of water year round.  This may have been due, in part, to the fact that many developers and 
agribusinesses in California knew that the state was entitled to water from the Colorado River as 
long as there was 7,500,000 acre feet available, as California had senior legal rights to river 
water.
190
 In fact, California could claim up to fifty percent of the water that flowed through the 
Colorado River during periods of heavy rain and runoff, but was even able to claim senior water 
rights as the water level in Lake Meade dropped below 39 percent of capacity. There were seven 
states that utilized water from the Colorado River Basin; however, California was able to garner 
the lion’s share of this resource at the southern end of the river system. This imbalance in 
distribution led to tension between California, Arizona, and Nevada in the 2000’s as the entire 
Southwest suffered water shortages. However, the Colorado River seemed to serve as a “safety 
valve” for farmers and residents in some parts of California, allowing them to deal with issues 
concerning their own water at some future date. As such, parts of the state that utilized water 
from the Colorado River included some of the only cities in the state that did not meet their water 
restriction goals.  
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Figure 6.6 Water from the Colorado River to California Residents.  This map shows where drinking 
water comes from for San Diego. It is interesting to note that this part of the state was the only area that 
did not meet the water restrictions imposed by the govenor, perhaps because the residents understood that 
they would be able to get water from outside of the state.
191
   
 
Problems with water supply, water quality, and land use were caused by both nature and 
man and had been occurring in California for over one hundred years. And yet, no long-term 
solutions regarding water use and land development had been reached as of 2016. Every time 
there was a drought, tensions between Northern and Southern California flared, but even the 
general public was divided over what to do about water issues as water restriction laws aimed at 
farmers seem undemocratic, un-American, and anticapitalistic. Further muddying the waters, 
agribusinesses tried to appeal to the public by presenting themselves as simple farmers just trying 
to make a living and get produce to markets at a decent price. Millions of dollars were spent each 
year on commercials and other advertisements encouraging consumers to purchase “heart 
healthy” walnuts, or “antioxidant boosting” pomegranate juice and these tactics were highly 
successful. Once again, the California State Grange was at the forefront of efforts aimed to 
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maintain some economic and political balance between small farmers and industrial farms. 
Members of the California Grange were opposed to agribusinesses taking over markets, utilizing 
farming techniques that were harmful to the environment, and use of genetically modified 
organisms in farming. This time around, the State Grange found itself in opposition to the 
National Grange who had embraced the farming methods used by corporate farms as they were 
seen as efficient and simply a consequence of progress. Grangers in California pushed back 
against the use of certain pesticide and the expansion of orchards in more arid parts of the 
Valley.
192
 For the most part, there was no shift in policy or the market; however, many residents 
were more open to organic and sustainable farming techniques. 
It was within this period of confusion and conflict, brought about by drought, that some 
state politicians and national pundits began to use water as a means to oppose government 
regulation. Water limits imposed by the state or federal government to stave off water shortages 
or environmental damage were presented as examples of “government overreach.” The notion 
that the free market should be applied to water and that farmers should have access to what they 
needed in order to make food grow sounded noble indeed. As such, in the early years of the 
drought farmers could be seen on the nightly news discussing how the delta smelt was ruining 
their farms and that the government cared more about fish than farmers. This may have appeared 
ridiculous to the average American not privy to the nuances of water use in the state. Such 
spectacles only served to change discussions respecting water restrictions from the realm of the 
practical and into a debate over the ideological. What was not presented to the audience at large 
was that there were limits to the amount of water available at any given time, and applying the 
term “free market” to a publicly funded project was misleading at best. 
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 Growers made billions of dollars using water from publicly funded water projects and 
received millions each year in federal subsidies.
193
 They continued to grow crops that needed 
more water in order to make more profits, and yet, when state and federal officials attempted to 
act responsibly by limiting resources, growers cried foul and clamored for less government 
intervention and regulation. It would have been impossible for farmers or agribusinesses to be 
able to, or want to, fund the CVP or SWP on their own. Taxpayers funded the construction of 
dams, canals, pumps, and hydroelectric power stations all through the Central Valley. It was this 
funding that allowed farmers and agribusinesses to become so successful. That did not mean a lot 
of hard work did not go into cultivating the land, what it does mean however, is that the land 
would not be worth cultivating without the water. Large landholders were aware of this 
predicament since they began consolidating land in the San Joaquin Valley in the late 1800’s and 
had skirted water regulation even before construction of water projects was initiated. They 
continued to pump water from aquifers at an alarming rate because such resources were available 
and proved difficult to regulate. In many cases this allowed for agricultural monopolies to gain 
control sectors of agricultural markets, this may have been true in many states, but was 
especially so in California.
194
 
Long and short-term solutions were not popular with most farmers and other residents in 
California. More dams, reservoirs, and other holding facilities seemed necessary to ensure water 
for further development and population growth. The construction of such facilities would come 
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at a great financial cost to California residents via taxation.  At this point, it seemed unlikely that 
citizens would happily pay for more construction of water storage systems in order for farmers, 
on the large or small scale, to continue to make profits. Such ideas went against all notions of 
how a free market was supposed to function and were contrarian to the arguments in opposition 
to government overreach. It was clear that new construction projects would have to be sold to the 
public as a means to provide water for urban and rural areas and to keep food costs down for 
consumers, not ensure profits in the agricultural sector if they were to be considered at all. 
Farmers themselves were even less likely to fund such structures, nor would they be able to fund 
such them on their own.  More water storage facilities remained a viable option, but one that 
would likely be addressed in the distant future. 
Another solution would be restricting ground water usage, but this did not appeal to most 
growers, especially those able to afford deep-well drilling. Supporters of restrictions often faced 
hostility from other growers, like one owner of a small walnut farm in Kings County that 
expressed his support of the new regulation which was passed in 2015 and was asked “Can you 
afford a bodyguard?”195 The new requirements were set to take effect in 2020, too far away to 
have an impact on the situation occurring in the 2010’s, but indicated that some lawmakers and 
farmers were willing to take the steps necessary to limit the impact of drought in the future. 
Unfortunately, because the law was not set to be enforced until 2020, those that were able to dig 
new wells or deepen those they already had, did so without permission from local, state, or 
federal agencies. Farmers were not required to inform any agencies when they deepened existing 
or dug new wells, so the potential remained for some to try and dig as many deep wells as they 
were able to before the law took effect.  Although there were some obvious weaknesses with 
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implementation, limiting how much water a grower was able to remove from the ground might 
eventually have the added benefit of naturally limiting the number of acres that could be planted. 
This would also impact the type of crops grown, potentially reducing the number of year round 
crops planted by farmers in the San Joaquin Valley.   
Simply restricting the type of crops or number of acres that can be planted in arid regions 
is also a viable solution. However, both this and the previous option led to controversy as they 
were seen by some as an overstep by the government, never mind that it was government 
funding which provided much of the water used for farming  It was also augmented that limiting 
crops for export would have a negative impact on food prices as well. Corporate farms would 
still need to make profits for investors so it seemed likely that domestic prices would go up 
recoup the difference.  Another argument against this solution was that by reducing the amount 
of crops grown, but allowing for inflated prices for exports to make up for lost revenue might 
cause some countries to get farm goods from someplace else and undermine the goal altogether.  
This scenario could lead to major job loss and reduction in tax revenue for California, which was 
already cash strapped.  
Although it made up only two percent of state revenue, sustainability of agriculture had 
long been an important issue, especially for policy makers and farmers. However, there did not 
seem to have been any discussion regarding limiting the number of acres a farmer or 
agribusiness should be allowed to plant during drought.  In fact, in a thirty-seven page report put 
out by American Farmland Trust to the California Department of Food and Agriculture 
published in 2010, a twelve step vision for promoting agricultural sustainability was presented, 
none of which mentioned limiting farming acreage. Some of the steps listed were reminiscent of 
old remedies which led to more stored water, but did nothing to stop a water crisis from 
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occurring again. If nothing else, there seemed to be a general fear that urban development would 
eventually push farming out of the Valley altogether and cause food prices to skyrocket.   
None of those promoting fear over government overreach and high food prices seemed to 
have a grasp of the historical roots of government intervention in agriculture. During the Great 
Depression, emergency measures were taken to ensure stability to the economy via stabilized 
farm prices. The Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed in 1933, then again in 1938, which 
provided farmers with subsidies to leave land fallow. Many critics of this policy claimed that it 
helped agribusinesses far in excess of family farmers. This may be true, but a similar plan may 
eventually be necessary to help curtail water use by farmers in California in years of crisis, but 
also to prevent a crisis from occurring in the first place. The 1996 Farm Bill offered a safety net 
for farmers across the United States willing to commit to three year crop rotations. Historically, 
most California farmers had not subscribed to this type of farming; instead, farmers themselves 
made the decision whether or not to limit the number of acres they planted during the 2011 
drought. No doubt, the decision to self-regulate was made most often when there were limited 
water supplies. Nonetheless, farmers across the state fallowed thousands of acres of row crops 
which did have a negative impact on farm revenue and agricultural employment throughout the 
Valley. The image below illustrates how each region of the Central Valley was impacted by this 
process and does appear to support the point that less farmland would have a negative impact on 
farm revenue and the economy in general. However, this was not a well-planned or organized 
endeavor to boost production prices and limit risk to farmers, it was reactionary at best. In 
addition, there was no great change in food prices in the marketplace during this period. A 
government program would allow for subsidies, prices supports, and guaranteed income in a 
targeted manner, with sustainability as a priority. 
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Fig 6.7 Estimated impacts of the 2015 California Drought on Crop Fallowing, Revenues, and 
Employment.
196
 Each of section of this image represents a different estimated impact for the state of 
California. However, crop prices, on average, did not increase dramatically in 2015 nor did they in 2016. 
If the drought continued past 2016, it would seem highly likely that there would be some price increase 
for farm goods produced in the Central Valley, but not in other areas of the country. 
 
Although many California residents might have been opposed to government 
intervention, to continue with water policy as it had been established was clearly dangerous and 
impractical. About twenty percent of California’s exports came from agriculture. In the Central 
Valley many people relied on farming directly or indirectly for their incomes. Lack of water 
regulation had put the San Joaquin Valley in a precarious situation for a very long time. Farmers 
and, more significantly, agribusinesses had increased the number of acres they planted, 
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converted to high profit, water- thirsty plants, and overused readily available underground water 
sources. The more aquifers that were depleted the more likely it was that they collapsed, 
rendering them forever useless. When there were especially wet years this issue lost momentum 
and disappeared from public discourse, but the problem did not resolved itself because of an 
increase in precipitation. Additionally, whenever there was “surplus” water, it was eventually 
allocated to be used for something, thus there was really no such thing as extra water. Corporate 
farms and developers had always found a way to use their wealth and political influence to 
garner access to the “extra” water. If water supplies were depleted and the drought continued 
past 2016, many small farmers would likely be driven out of business and agricultural 
monopolies would continue to consolidate land across the West. In addition, prolonged drought 
would cause the price of agricultural products to increase for consumers across the country. 
More farm laborers would likely be unemployed and sink deeper into poverty, increasing the 
strain on financial assistance programs in the state while reducing tax revenues.   
The California water crisis was a disaster-in-the making for more than a century. Some 
sort of balance needed to be reached between how water was used and efforts to generate ever 
higher profits in the agricultural sector. The warning signs that Taylor, Gates, and Goldschmidt 
hoped would lead to real change in water policy were the same signs apparent in 2011 but had 
become more compounded and complicated over time. Regardless of the level of difficulty this 
problem presented, it was clear to many that drastic measures needed to be taken. And, although 
restrictions on aquifer use were passed in 2015, for the most part little had been done to address 
the underlying causes of water shortages in California. What was lacking, in general, was a close 
examination of a culture in which profits were more important than the ideals of democracy. 
Americans needed to come to terms with the idea that capitalism may not have been what 
 
 
126 
  
continued to propel the success of the United States in twenty-first century, but rather such 
principals impeded rational people from making reasonable decisions regarding water use.  Until 
the limits of capitalism are recognized and can become part of a broader discussion about the use 
of resources, it is unlikely that California will see any meaningful change to water policy, and 
water scarcity will continue to be a problem for residents of the state. 
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